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During the Survey year. legislation was enacted relating to
twenty-seven of the sixty-five articles of the CPLR. Additionally.
there have been significant developments in the decisional law of
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res judicata. These and other areas should be of interest to the
practitioner.'

While the Civil Practice portion of the Survey has traditionally focused on developments in recent decisional law, it is important for the practitioner to be aware of many of the new amendments to the Civil Practice rule^.^ Several of them are highlighted
below. In addition, the new individual assignment system and the
uniform rules of the court are mentioned.

A. Section 214-c Last Exposure Rule Buried
Section 214-c,9 as enacted by Chapter 682 of the Laws of 1986,
became effective on July 30,1986.' The statute provides that in all
cases of exposure to a substance, the statute of limitations begins
to run when the injury is, or with reasonable diligence could have
The statute applies to personal injury claims
been, di~covered.~
and property damage claims, but does not apply to medical or dental malpractice actions.@The statute directly overrules prior decisional law that required an action to be commenced within three

1. T h e author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and advice o f Professor
Richard T. Farrell o f Brooklyn Law School. Professor Farrell was the author o f the New
York Practice segment o f the Survey during the ten year period prior to this article. Following Professor Farrell's advice, I have tried to selectively review the areas o f change in civil
practice and procedure which I believe will be o f interest to the practitioner. Reference to
further decisional law is contained in the 1986 Supplements to Volumes I-VIII o f W E I N STEIN-KORN-MILLER,
for which I serve as a co-author.
2. Numerous amendments have been made to the CPLR during this Survey year. For a
summary o f these amendmenta see attached appendix.
3. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987).
4. See Siege], New York Adopts a "Discovery" Rule For Exposure Cases-And Even
Offers a Short Time for Which T o Revive Expired Claims, 321 N.Y. ST. L. DIG.,at 1 (1986);
Cook, The New York Law Likely to Spur Filings of Toxic-Tort Claims, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22,
1986, § 1, at 10, col. 1; Wise, Battle Lines Are Drawn I n Fight Over Toxic-Tort Law,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Law Signed t o Extend Time for Filing Toxic-Tort Suits,
N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Rheingold, The New Statute of Limitations In Tort
Actions i n New York, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Hoenig, More on Tort Reform-The New Statutes, 196 N.Y.L.J., July 24,1986, at 1, col. 1; Marlin & Levy, New York
Adopts Discovery Rule For Latent-Disease Cases, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Fox,
Reforms i n Liability Insurance Urged by State Advisory Panel, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8,1986, at 1,
col. 3.
5. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c.
6. See id.
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years from the date of last exposure to a toxic or harmful substance, even in those cases when the injured person was unaware of
the injury.' The statute revives time-barred claims8 in cases of exposure to DES, tungsten-carbide, asbestos, chlordane and polyvi.~
cases, involving these five substances,
nyl c h l ~ r i d e Time-barred
are revived even if they were previously litigated but dismissed on
statute of limitations grounds.'O Certain wrongful death actions
may not be covered."
1. Discovery Rule

The discovery rule provision of newly added CPLR 214-c14
states, in material part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of 214, the three year period
within which an action to recover for personal injury or injury to
property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance
or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within the
body or upon or within property must be commenced shall be
computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff
or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff,
whichever is earlier.lS

CPLR 214-c" applies to all acts, omissions or failures occur-

7. See Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888,467 N.E.2d 571, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853
(1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 967 (1985); Steinhardt v. Johns Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d
1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981), cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub
nom., Rosenberg v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 456 U.S. 967 (1982); Thornton v. Rwevelt
Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780,391 N.E.2d 1002,417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Schwartz v. Heydon Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, remittitur amended,
12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374.U.S. 808 (1963);
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936); see also
Segalla & Galbo, Asbestos: New York's Approach to the Statute of Limitations, 57 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 28 (1985).
8. See Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682,209 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1567 (codified
a t N.Y. CPLR 214(c)).
9. See id. For a short definition of each substance see Rheingold, supra note 4.
10. See Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682, 209 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1567.
11. See Rheingold, supra note 4 (most wrongful death actions, except ones which were
not barred at the time of the decedent's death, are revived without any time limitation); see
also N.Y. EPTL 5:4-1 (under New York law, a wrongful death action is available only if the
decedent possessed a viable personal injury action a t the time of death).
12. N.Y. CPLR 214-C.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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ring prior to, on, or after July 1, 1986.16 The statute may not apply
to some pre-July 1, 1986 acts or omissions if the action was already
time-barred and the injury was or should have been discovered
prior to that date.16 Nonetheless, some of the actions already
barred are revived by a separate revival provision.17 Professor
Siegel points out that if the plaintiff discovers an injury and is unable to relate it to the cause, CPLR 214-c(4)18gives him five years
If the plaintiff discovers the
to establish the requisite causati~n.'~
cause within five years after discovery of the injury, he obtains an
additional one year from the discovery of the cause to bring an
action20 The plaintiff must show that the "technical, scientific or
medical knowledge and information sufficient to ascertain the
cause of his injury had not been discovered, identified or determined" in time to inform him earlier.21 If the plaintiff fails to discover the cause within five years after discovery of the injury,
~ ~ ~ to be inapplicable and the claim is barred.23
CPLR 2 1 4 - appears
The practitioner should be aware that because the term "discovery
of the injury" is not defined in CPLR 214-c,2' application of decisional law will be necessary to establish when the time period begins to run. There are at least four "discovery of injury" definitions
which may be adopted by New York courts. First, the date of discovery occurs with the discovery of the injury and the c a u s a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Second, the date of discovery is when the plaintiff knows, or by
reasonable diligence should know, of his injury and that it was
probably caused by the wrongful acts of another.16 Third, discovery occurs when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasona-

15. See id.
16. See Marlen & Levy, supra note 4, a t 30.
17. See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
18. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c(4).
19. See Siegel, supra note 4, a t 1.
20. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c(4).
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See Siegel, supra note 4, a t 1.
24. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c.
25. See Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1969) (defining "discovery" as the knowledge of the injury together with the knowledge of
the cause); see also Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164,371 A.2d 170 (1977) (following majority rule enunciated in the Warrington case).
26. See Nolan v. Johns-Manville, Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d
778, 392 N.E.2d 1352 (1979), aff'd, 85 IU. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981).
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ble diligence should know, that he suffers from a particular condit i ~ n . ~Fourth,
'
the date of discovery is when the disease manifests
itself.28 The latter approach impliedly obligates a person to seek
medical attention when the symptoms of his injury or disease appear. This final approach is the most likely to be adopted by New
York courts.28
2. The Revivor Statute

Revival occurs only for claims that originate from one of the
five substances previously m e n t i ~ n e d .A~ll~ such prior exposure
substance cases not brought before July 30, 1986 because of the
statute of limitations time bar, or those brought and dismissed
prior to July 30 on statute of limitations grounds, are revived for
one year.s1 Revival occurs if, when the cause of action accrued, the
injured person, having been fully aware of his rights, chose not to
sue?%
The revivor statute states that an action may be "commenced

27. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). In Borel,
the United States Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs claim was not barred by the
statute of limitations when he had filed his claim only seven months after an operation
revealed for the first time that he had asbestosis. See id. a t 1100. In stating the rule, the
court held that "in cases involving similar injuries resulting from exposures to deleterious
substances over a period of time, courts have consistently held that the cause of the action
does not accrue until the effects of such exposures manifest themselves." Id. at 1102. The
court of appeals concluded that the effects of the exposure only manifest themselves upon
diagnosis. See id.
28. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). In Urie, the United States Supreme
Court adopted a discovery rule, rejecting any construction of the statute of limitations
which would bar the cause of action before the plaintiff knew he had been injured.
29. If the Legislature had intended causation to be part of the discovery period, reference would have been made, as it was elsewhere, to "technical, scientific or medical" knowledge necessary for causation. New York courts have traditionally placed great emphasis on
interpreting various statutes of limitations to conform with the Legislature's desire to proCPLR MANUAL
vide repose to potential defendants. See generally WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER,
3 2.01 (1986 ed.) [hereinafter CPLR MANUAL].The practitioner and the courts, however,
should be aware of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (19861, which directs state statute of limitations periods for personal
injury or property damage claims caused by exposure to any "hazardous substance," or
"pollutant or contaminant" released into the environment from a "facility," to conform with
the federally required commencement date. The federal date means the date the plaintiff
knew, or reasonably should have known, that the personal injury or property damage was
caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.
30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31. See Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682, 209 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1567.
32. See id.
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within the year following July 30, 1986."33 What if, as of July 15,
1986, a case was pending in which a statute of limitations defense
had been asserted? Can such a defense be expected to prevail? The
intent of the statute probably was to cover this situation and consequently, the defense would not prevail. If there is any doubt,
however, the lawyer should commence a new action. The revival
statute expressly excuses the past failure to file a notice of claim
and provides that no notice of claim is needed in actions against
the state or municipalitie~.~'One should note that revision of the
laws on joint liabilitys6and the new collateral source rule3=do not
pertain to suits revived under CPLR 214-~(4).~'
Practitioners should expect the constitutionality of the revivor
statute to be challenged. Insurance companies and manufacturers
have been considering legal action to block the revival period as an
unconstitutional impairment of ont tract.^^ Although it is fairly
clear that the Legislature can extend a prior period of limitation~,3~
insurance companies will probably argue that the revival law will
force them to cover claims that were not taken into consideration
in the setting of premiums because they were time barred when
the policies were written.'O This challenge should be unsuccessful

33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
37. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c.
38. See Wise, supra note 4, a t 1.
39. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) (Texas Legislature could suspend running of a statute of limitations without violating due process clause of fourteenth amendment); see also Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164, 93 N.E.2d 620 (1950) (Legislature could amend the statute of limitations to revive statutory claim for person imprisoned
by the Germans during World War 11); Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock Repair Co., 238 N.Y.
271, 144 N.E. 579 (1924); McCann v. Walsh Constr., 282 A.D. 444, 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (3d
Dep't 19531, aff'd,306 N.Y. 904, 119 N.E.2d 596 (1954) (Legislature's revival of worker's
compensation statute for certain slow starting diseases constitutionally valid because circumstances were such as to indicate a strong moral obligation to do so); Hintz v. State Tax
Comm'n, 55 Misc. 2d 474, 285 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1966).
40. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). Spannaus successfully challenged a Minnesota law which required companies in a pension plan to pay certain
benefits when they closed an office, irrespective of the terms stated in the plan. The Court
found that the Minnesota statute operated retroactively to modify payments required under
the pension plan and that the company had reasonably relied on actuarial predictions to
determine what funding would be necessary to sustain the contractually mandated paymenb. Because the statute addressed no pressing societal concern, the United States Supreme Court concluded that it was a significant impairment of the contract and thus violative of the fourteenth amendment. The Spannuus case should be distinguishable on two
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in view of the Court of Appeals' past deference to the Legislature's
retroactive application of statutes of lirnitati~ns.~'

B. New Rules for Joint and Several Liability
On July 30,1986, Chapter 682 of the Laws of 1986 added Article 16 to the CPLR.'2 This provision should partially transform the
law of joint and several liability in tort cases, posing new problems
for trial lawyers and j~dges.'~Traditionally,joint tortfeasors have
been liable both jointly and severally." In other words, the injured
plaintiff could choose whether to sue one or all of the joint
tortfeasors. Thus, if a joint tortfeasor was ten percent liable for a
tort, he could be required to pay one hundred percent of the plaintiffs damages and then be forced to collect the remaining ninety
percent from whomever else was liable.'6 Article 16 changed this
concept in several ways. First, the defendant must be more than
fifty percent liable before joint and several liability will be applied
to him regarding a "non-economic loss."46 Non-ecomomic loss includes, but is not limited to, pain and suffering, mental anguish
and loss of ~onsortiurn.'~The main provision does not apply to
wrongful death cases or property damage cases because they involve economic 10sses.'~If a defendant is found to be fifty percent
or less liable, liability for non-economic loss will be limited to his
equitable share.4s

grounds. First, it did not address an important societal issue (here, thousands of innocent
people were barred from having meritorious claims heard). Second, the New York revival
statute is limited in scope and time because it only allows claims barred before the amendment was enacted for a limited one year period.
41. See supra note 39.
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1567-69 (codi42. See Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682,209 MCKINNEY
fied a t N.Y. CPLR 1600-1603 (McKinney Supp. 1987)).
43. See McLaughlin, New Joint Several Liability Law: Problems for Lawyers and
Judges, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 1986, a t 1, col. 3; see also Hoenig, supra note 4; Siegel, The New
Law Partially Abolishing the Joint Liability in Tort Cases, Parts I, II, & 111, 322-24 N.Y.
ST. L. DIG., Oct., Nov., Dec., 1986.
44. See generally 2A WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER,
NEW YORKCIVIL
PRACTICE
3 1401.04
(1986).
45. Id.
46. See N.Y. CPLR 1601(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
47. See id. 3 1600.
48. See id. 3 1601(1). Economic losses susceptible to immediate mathematical calculation are not covered by Article 16 and remain subject to the traditional joint and several
liability laws.
49. See id.
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Assume that the practitioner files a negligence action seeking
one million dollars in damages and names as defendants a homeowner, an installer, and a manufacturer. If the homeowner is found
ten percent liable, the installer is found forty percent liable and
the manufacturer is found fifty percent liable, none of them will be
responsible for more than their share of the one million dollars attributed to pain and suffering. Thus, if the installer who is forty
percent responsible has no insurance coverage and is otherwise liability-proof, the plaintiff will be unable to collect forty percent of
his non-economic damages. The plaintiff can collect the entire
amount of his economic loss from any of the defendants because
these damages are not covered by the new statute.
Article 16 also implies that the plaintiff must join all persons
possibly liable as defendants in order to prevent a named defend~ ~ example, asant from shifting the liability to a n ~ n - p a r t y .For
sume the plaintiff sued only the manufacturer and not the installer
or homeowner. In the past, a plaintiff could recover the entire
judgment from the "deep pocket" manufacturer. Under newly
added Article 16, however, if the plaintiff names the deep pocket
manufacturer as the sole defendant, and the manufacturer is less
than fifty-one percent liable, the plaintiff will only recover for the
manufacturer's percentage of liability. Of course, if the manufacturer was more than fifty percent responsible, he can still be liable
for all of the damages. But why take that chance?
CPLR 160261sets forth eleven exceptions to the new rule. The
most important exception for most lawyers is subdivision 6 of section 1602:= which applies to automobile accident cases other than
those involving a municipal vehicle. Thus, in the classical three car
intersection collision case, a plaintiff can still recover the entire
judgment from a deep pocket defendant who is only one percent
liable.68Other important exceptions include claims filed under the

50. See infra note 93 and accompanying text relating to amended CPLR 8303(a) (sanctions for frivolous pleadings). While Article 16 suggests naming every possible defendant,
CPLR 8303(a) suggest3 that by doing so, the practitioner may be subject to sanctions. Thus,
whenever it becomes clear that a designated defendant should be dropped from the action,
the lawyer should do so expeditiously to avoid such sanctions.
51. See N.Y. CPLR 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
52. See id. $ 1602(6).
53. Excerpts from remarks by Lucille Fontana, Esq., at a Continuing Legal Education
forum, the New York Practice Update, presented on October 15, 1986 at the Pace University School of Law.
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Worker's Compensation Law:' and claims subject to Article 10 of
the Labor LawP6
CPLR 160368requires that a party asserting the limitations on
liability prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that one
of the eleven exceptions applies or that he is fifty percent or less
responsible for the liability.67Because Article 16 is only effective as
of July 30, 1986, there is no decisional law interpreting the preponderance of evidence standard under Section 1603.68

C. Itemized Verdicts
CPLR 4111(f)68was enacted by Chapter 682 of the Laws of
1986 and became effective on July 30,1986. Subsection (f) is applicable in personal injury, property damage and wrongful death actions not subject to subdivisions (d) and (e) of the rule.60Subdivisions (d) and (e) refer to medical or dental malpractice, personal
injury, and wrongful death actions against public employers?'
CPLR 4111(f)82requires that upon a ihding of damages, the court
must instruct the jury to specify the applicable elements of special
and general damages on which the award is based and the amount
of damages assigned to each element.6s The allocation may include,
but is not limited to, medical expenses, dental expenses, loss of
earnings, impairment of earning ability, and pain and suffering?'
Elements must be further itemized into compensation prior to
the verdict and future damages.85The jury shall set forth the period of years over which the amounts are intended to provide comp e n s a t i ~ nIn
. ~ computing
~
the damages, the jury shall be instructed
to award the full amount of future damages without reduction to

54. See N.Y.CPLR 1602(4).
55. See id. 3 1602(8).
56. See id. $ 1603.
57. See id.
58. See id. The practitioner, however, should anticipate litigation in this area because
the preponderance of the evidence standard contemplates a traverse hearing.
59. See N.Y. CPLR 4111(f) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
60. See id.
61. See id. 5 4111(d), (e).
62. See id. 5 4111(f).
63. See id.
64. See generally Hoenig, supra note 4, at 1.
65. See N.Y. CPLR 4111(f).
66. See id.
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D. Collateral Source Rule
CPLR 454568 was amended by Chapter 266 of the Laws of
1986 and became effective on June 28, 1986. The amendment
added subdivision (c) which is applicable to personal injury, property damage or wrongful death actions where a plaintiff seeks to
recover for the cost of medical care, dental care, custodial care, rehabilitation services, loss of earnings or other economic loss.8s
In these cases, evidence will be admissible to establish that
any such past or future cost or expense was, or will with reasonable
certainty, be replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part, from any
collateral source such as insurance, social security, disability plans,
and pension plans?O Thus, collateral source evidence of this type is
available to mitigate damages in all personal injury, property damage or wrongful death actions?l This provision does not apply to
life i n ~ u r a n c e .Plaintiffs
~~
can no longer introduce their medical
bills into evidence if they have been, or will be, collaterally reimbursed for them.7s

E. Periodic Payment of Awards
Article 50-B7' was enacted by Chapter 682 of the Laws of 1986
and became effective on July 30,1986. It provides that the jury will
be asked to render a verdict itemizing damages between past special, past general, future special and future general damage^?^ The

67. See id.
68. See N.Y. CPLR 4545(c) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
69. See id.
79. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Hoenig, Products Liability, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 1986,a t 1, col. 1 (citing Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Garrett Corp., 625 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
74. Newly added Article 50-B of the CPLR consists of provisions 5041 through 5049
and is entitled "Periodic Payment of Judgments In Personal Injury, Injury to Property and
Wrongful Death Actions."
75. See N.Y. CPLR 5041 (McKinney Supp. 1987). In 1985 Article 50-A of the CPLR
was enacted. It created the structured judgment. In 1986 the structured judgment requirement was extended to tort actions in general by Article 50-B.See N.Y. CPLR art. 50 (McKinney Supp. 1987);see ako Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV.135 (1986);Note, Medical Malpractice Reform, 14 FORDHAMURB.L.J. 773,787
(1986).
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plaintiff will receive a lump sum payment for all past and future
damages not in excess of $250,000, and any damages, fees or costs
otherwise payable in a lump sum.76 With respect to awards of future damages in excess of $250,000, plaintiffs will receive the present value of a structured annuity contract that will provide for
payment of the remaining amounts of future damages in periodic
in~tallments.?~
The annual payment for the first year will be determined by dividing the remaining amount of future damages by the
number of years over which the payment will be made.78 Payment
in each successive year shall be computed by adding four percent
to the previous year's payment.7s
Thus, if a plaintiff is awarded $750,000 for future payments to
be structured from one to ten years, the jury must first find how
long the person is expected to live. If the person's likely life expectancy is five years, the award must be structured over a five year
period. If the life expectancy is ten years or more, the award cannot be structured for more than ten years. The $750,000, minus
$250,000 which can be paid in a lump sum to the plaintiff, will be
calculated through an annuity table to determine the present sum
necessary for investment to yield $500,000 over a ten year period.
If $375,000 is necessary for the ten year payout of $500,000, the
attorney's contingent fee will be based on that figure. In addition,
the defendant is personally liable, along with his insurance company, for the payments during the structured time period. So, if
the insurance company underwriting the annuity goes bankrupt,
the individual remains liable on the judgment for all amounts unpaid by the annuity.80

F. Health Care Arbitration
Newly enacted Article 75-A provides that all health maintenance organizations (HMO's) must offer arbitration to their subscribers as an alternative to a malpractice action and health care
professionals must participate in the a r b i t r a t i ~ n .The
~ ~ plaintiff
must decide whether to participate in arbitration within twenty

76. See
77. See
78. See
79. See
80. See
81. See

id. 3 5041(b).
id. 3 5041(e).
id.
id.
Fontana, supra note 53.
N.Y.CPLR 7551 (McKiney Supp. 1987).
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days after receipt of the defendant's arbitration demand.82 If the
plaintiff consents to arbitration and the defendant then serves a
concession of liability upon the plaintiff, damages will be arbit r a l ~ d Although
.~~
the defendant's concession of liability is not
binding upon him for any other purpose, the arbitrator's decision
as to damages is binding on all parties unless modified or vacated
pursuant to the CPLR.a4
The new proceeding is to be commenced and conducted in accordance with CPLR 75.86 Damages will be determined, pursuant
to provisions of law applicable in medical and dental malpractice
. ~ ~ may take deposiactions, by a panel of three a r b i t r a t ~ r sParties
tions and conduct discovery with the same rights, remedies, and
obligations as in a civil action.87Persons who enroll in HMO's after
the effective date of the amendment must arbitrate all medical
malpractice claims.s8 Otherwise, in the absence of a concession of
liability by the defendant, there is no required a r b i t r a t i ~ n . ~ ~

G. Sanctions for Frivolous Claims
Article 8303(a) of the CPLRsOwas amended by Chapter 220 of
the Laws of 1986:' which became effective on June 28, 1986.92The
article is applicable to claims, counterclaims, and defenses brought
by plaintiffs or defendants for personal injury, property, or wrongful death actions found by the court to be frivolous.93A finding of
frivolity can be made at any time during the proceedings or upon
judgment, and such a finding permits the court to award to the

82. See id. 8 7556.
83. See id. (service of concession o f liability must be made within twenty days after
plaintiff's election).
84. See id. 8 7565.
85. See id. $8 7550-7556.
86. See id. 8 7554.
87. See id. 8 7561.
88. See id. 1 7551.
89. See Bower, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Analysis of Medical Malpractice Reform,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8,1986,at 1, col. 3; Connors, An Analysis of New York Medical Malpractice
Reform, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
90. See N.Y. CPLR 8303(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
91. Act o f June 28,1986 ch. 220,209 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1208 (to be codified at N.Y. CPLR 8303(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987)).
92. Id.
93. See generally, Broder, Trial Tactics and Techniques, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 1986, at 1,
col. 1.
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successful party costs and reasonable attorney fees, not exceeding
$10,000.s4 CPLR 830396is in some respects similar to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)s6 that provides for
the imposition of sanctions for the filing of frivolous pleadings. Although a discussion of recent developments with respect to FRCP
lls7
is beyond the scope of this article, every New York lawyer engaged in federal practice should become familiar with those recent
developments.9s
The first question for attorneys concerned with the impact of
CPLR 8303se is the meaning of the term "frivolous." One distinguished judge has defined it to mean ''[of] little or no weight, value
or importance; paltry; trumpery; not worthy of serious attention;
pleading:
having no reasonable ground or purpose-[i]n
[mlanifestly insufficient or futile."100 Furthermore, application of
sanctions under CPLR 83031°' will depend on whether New York
courts follow the objective standard of frivolity suggested by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Eastway Construction Corp. v.
New York,lo2or a subjective standard which will be more apt to
protect attorneys who honestly reach unreasonable conclusions
about the factual or legal strength of their cases.lo8
94. See id.
95. N.Y. CPLR 8303(a).
96. See FED. R CIV. P. 11.
97. Id.
98. It is important to note that federal courts in the Second Circuit have adopted an
objective, instead of a subjective, approach to the imposition of sanctions under FRCP 11.
See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Ci. 1986); see also Dombroff,
Attorneys I n AfFrming Pleadings Risk Sanctions, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 27, 1986, a t 15, col. 6;
Adams & Nolan, Pretrial Abuses Now Punished by U.S. Courts, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 17, 1986,
a t 15, col. 1; Kohn, Circuit Court Upsets Sanction of Lawyer For "Meritless" Suit,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1986, a t 1,col. 3. For a list of sanction cases during the 1986 Survey year,
see Silberberg, Civil-Practice Roundup in the Southern District, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1985,
Jan. 3, Feb. 5, Mar. 6, Apr. 4, May 8, June 6, July 9, Aug. 12, Sept. 4, Oct. 9, Nov. 7, Dec. 16,
1986, a t 1, col. 3.
99. See N.Y. CPLR 8303.
100. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 637 F. Supp. 558,565 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing
Oxford English Dictionary (1971)).
101. See N.Y.CPLR 8303.
102. 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1986). Eastway I held that policy requires FRCP 11
not to be read according to its literal terms; instead, the Second Circuit stated "[s]anctions
shall be imposed [if], after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
. ."See id. In other words, Eastway I holds attorneys strictly liable for mistakes in judgment that lead to the filing of papers later deemed frivolous. See id.
103. Chief Judge Jack Weinstein suggests that the subjective element of a sanction

..
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The second question relates to the amount of costs and attorney fees to be awarded to the successful party under CPLR
8303.1°' Apparently, the court can order that the costs and fees be
paid by either the client or his attorney. As to the amount
awarded, this determination should depend on the court's consideration of mitigating factors such as: (1) whether the client and
lawyer believed they were correct in taking the course they did, (2)
whether the frivolity was for the purpose of punishing an opponent, (3) whether the lawyer is a neophyte or an experienced advocate, (4) the ability to pay, (5) the need for compensation, (6) the
degree of frivolity, and (7) the dangers of chilling the particular
kind of litigation involved.
Lawyers seeking to avoid sanctions under CPLR 8303(a)1°"
should take protective measures. First, before filing any pleading
or taking any course of action during litigation, the attorney
should read CPLR 8303(a).lo8This is important, not so much as an
exercise, but so that when resisting a section 8303(a)Io7sanction
defense, one can file an affidavit asserting that it was specifically
considered. One should ask himself if the facts of the case justify
the filing of a particular pleading. For example, is the pleading in
question based upon existing law or seeking an extension, modification or reversal of existing law? Is it counsel's intent to harass,
delay or increase the cost of the litigation? Some lawyers are, as a
matter of common practice, asserting 8303(a)lo8defenses in their
answers. This would itself appear to be a violation of the new sanctions rule.
Another factor to raise in resisting the imposition of sanctions
under CPLR 83031°e 4s the amount of time available for investigation. For example, if the sanctioned matter arises in a special proceeding,"O the amount of time available to investigate or make a
"reasonable inquiry" would be far less than that involved in most
kinds of litigation. One must also consider the source of informa-

rule, such as FRCP 11, is satisfied when an attorney makes a "reasonable inquiry into the
facts and law." See Eastway Constr., 637 F. Supp. at 567-68.
104. See N.Y. CPLR 8303(a).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See D. SIEGEL,
NEWYORKPRACTICE
3 547 (1978).

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 81 1987-1988

82

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 38:67

tion upon which the attorney is relying. In many instances the information must come from the client, placing a duty on counsel to
verify pertinent facts. Another factor is whether the representations of forwarding counsel or some other member of the bar were
relied on by the present counsel. If so, sanctions under CPLR
8303(a)'11 are less likely to be applied.
Lawyers should also be aware of sanctions that can be applied
under the new individual assignment rules,n2 CPLR 3126llS or
pursuant to the inherent powers of the court."'

H. Pretrial Seizure Orders
Article 13-An6of the CPLR was enacted in 1984 and amended
earlier during the Survey year.lls This provision allows assets of
criminal defendants to be frozen, pending the outcome of their
criminal trials, in order to satisfy a possible judgment allowing a
recovery against their gains from illegal activities. In Morgenthau
v. Citisource, Inc.,l17 the Court of Appeals reversed the appellate
division which, in an issue of first impression, had ruled that pretrial seizure orders under Article 13-A of the CPLR118were limited
to funds that could be directly traced to the proceeds of a crime.

I. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
Newly amended CPLR 5601,11s which became effective on
January 1, 1986, dramatically effects the jurisdiction of the New

111. See N.Y. CPLR 8303(a).
112. See infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 505-11 and accompanying text.
114. See Fox, Sanctions Weighed Against Law Firm on Conflict Issue, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
28,1.986, at 1, col. 3; see ako A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29,1986,
a t 1, col. 6 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986) (the Court of Appeals held that courts have the power to
impose money sanctions, but left open the issue of whether the power "is inherent to the
judicial function or is merely delegable by the Legislature under our Constitution"); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914 (2d Dep't 1985);
115. N.Y. CPLR Art. 13-A (McKinney Supp. 1987).
116. See N.Y. CPLR 1349(d). This section was amended by replacing the condition of a
pre-conviction forfeiture crime with a felony. Paragraph (e) was amended by replacing the
condition of a post-forfeiture crime with "all other crimes." Both amendments became effective on July 1, 1986. See N.Y. CPLR 1349(d), (e) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
117. 68 N.Y.2d 211, 500 N.E.2d 850, 508 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1986).
118. See N.Y. CPLR art. 13-A.
119. See N.Y. CPLR 5601 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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York Court of Appeals.lz0No longer will a reversal or modification
by the appellate division, or the presence of a single dissenter in an
affirmance support an appeal of right.lZ1 Two dissenters are now
necessary in the appellate division for an automatic appeal.lZ2Similarly, appeal by permission is expanded. Where the appeal of right
was, but is no longer available, the appellant must apply for leave
to appeal. CPLR 5602(a)123was amended and requires the Court to
adopt rules assuring that if any two of the Court's seven judges
vote to grant leave, such leave will be granted.12'
The Court of Appeals has also adopted Rule 500.17,126effective January 1, 1986, which authorizes a certification procedure
whereby other courts may, by written application, request from it
the answer to questions of New York law. This rule allows the
Court of Appeals to render advisory opinions at the request of the
United States Supreme Court, a federal court of appeals, or a court
of last resort of another state.IZ6

J. New Uniform Rules and Individual Assignment System
Last year's Civil Practice segment of the Survey briefly discussed the new Individual Assignment System (IAS),lZ7which was
implemented on January 6, 1986. During its first seven months of
operation the IAS has succeeded in cutting caseloads in the State
Supreme Court in New York City by more than ten percent.lZsIn

120. See Gleason & Ferlazo, The Court of Appeals Moves Towards "Certiorari" Sta58 N.Y. ST. B.J. 4 (May 1986).
121. Previously under New York CPLR section 5601, one dissenter was sufficient for an
appeal of right; that subdivision was amended, effective January 1, 1986, to offer an appeal
of right only when there are two dissenters in the appellate division. See N.Y. CPLR 5601.
122. See id.
123. See N.Y. CPLR 5602(a).
124. The Court of Appeals implemented New York CPLR 5602(a) by amending its
Rule 500.11, also effective January 1, 1986, to provide that two judges can grant leave for
1987 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT8 500.11 (22 NYCRR 500.11). Anappeal. See MCKINNEY'S
other rule of the Court of Appeals, effective on the same date, dispenses with separate papers for notice of motion, brief and affidavit, and allows a single document to contain all of
these items.
125. MCKINNEY'S
1987 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT8 500.17 (22 NYCRR 500.17).
126 See Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, No. 86-2-7194 (2d Cir. Jan. 5, 1987) (the first
use of certification procedure, this case involved an interpretation of section 104-B(2) of the
New York Social Services Law).
127. See Brodsky, Civil Practice, 1985 Survey of N.Y. Law, 37 SYRACUSE
L. REV.264,
288 (1986).
128. See Wise, 7-Month Report On IAS Hailed by Bellocosa, N.Y.L.J., July 31,1986, a t
tus,
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addition, by July 20, 1986 the new system had disposed of 16,255
notes of issue and thus pared the number of pending notes by
nine-percent.12eA full discussion of the IAS is set forth by Professor Siegel in volumes 312 through 315 of the New York State Law
Digest.ls0
Reference should also be made to the Uniform Rules of the
Court (U.R.) which became effective on January 6, 1986.1s1The
new rules formally require two conferences. One is the "preliminary conference" and the other is a "pretrial conference." The preliminary conference is mandatorylS2in all situations except where
there is no occasion to require a Request for Judicial Intervention
and the parties are able to conduct pretrial disclosure without a
judicial supervisor. Otherwise, the conference is held and usually
serves the purpose of establishing a time table for disclosure proceedings. These proceedings generally must be completed within
twelve months of the assignment of the action to the judge. Compliance with the disclosure order is important in view of U.R.
ZOZ.l2(g),lSs which provides for sanctions. The pretrial conference
occurs after a notice of issue is filed,'" and serves to explore settlement and to prepare the case for trial.
The practitioner should also note U.R. 202.15lS6on the vide-

1, col. 2; IAS STUDY
REPORTby Office of Court Administration, cited in, IAS "Effective"in
First Year But Needs Some Improvement, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1987, a t 1, col. 3; ZAS STUDY
REPORTby Office of Court Administration, reprinted in, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24,1987, a t 5, col. I.
129. See id; see also N.Y. COUNTY
LAWYER,
Sept. 1986, a t 3. Justice Xavier C. Riccobono, Administrative Judge for the Civil Branch of New York County points out that
under the IAS 6,218 matters were disposed of during the first five terms of 1986, compared
to 2,048 for the same period in 1985. Furthermore, Justice Riccobono notes that under the
IAS 37.9% more settlements have been achieved than under the Master Calendar system
and 84.7% more jury trials were commenced. See id.
130. See Siegel, The Uniform Rules Take Effect,312-15 N.Y. ST. L. DIG.,Dec. 1985Mar. 1986, a t 1.
131. See generally, Siegel, The Uniform Rules Take Effect (January 6, 1986). Part I:
The Individual Assignment System, 312 N.Y. ST. L. DIG.,Dec. 1985, a t 1.
132. See MCKINNEY'S
1987 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT8 202.12 (22 NYCRR 202.12).
133. See id. 8 202.12(g), which states in pertinent part:
In the discretion of the court, failure of a party to comply with the order or transcript resulting from the preliminary conference, or the making of unnecessary or
frivolous motions by a party, shall result in the imposition upon such party of costs
or such other sanctions as are authorized by law.
See also McLaughlii v. Henke, 130 Mic. 2d 109, 499 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co.
1986) (first case involving sanctions under the new rules).
1987 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT$ 202.26 (22 NYCRR 202.26).
134. See MCKINNEY'S
135. Id. 3 202.15 (22 NYCRR 202.15).
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otaping of depositions, U.R. 202.16136governing financial disclosure
in matrimonial actions, and U.R. 202.1713' relating to the exchange
of medical reports in tort actions. Also, calendar and preference
rules are, for the most part, left to each individual judge's
dis~retion.'~~
Finally, it is essential for the practitioner to become familiar
with the individual rules of each judge. Rules relating to when a
judge will hear motions or allow oral argument have been issued in
"information sheets" which are readily accessible to members of
the bar. Thus, as in federal practice, it is a good idea to contact a
judge's law secretary to determine what particular procedures, if
any, other than those of the CPLR and Uniform Rules are to be
followed.

A. Constitutional Limitations on I n Personam Jurisdiction
Last year's Survey Civil Practice segment did not discuss the
constitutional standards upon which the bases of New York courts'
assertions of jurisdiction are based.lgS The most recent United
States Supreme Court decision analyzing these standards is Burger
King Corp. v. Rud~ewicz."~In Burger King,"' the plaintiff, a Florida corporation, sued the defendant, a Michigan resident, for
breach of a franchise agreement."2 The agreement provided that
the defendant and his business partner would operate a Burger
King restaurant in Michigan for twenty years.Ms The contract,
Id. 5 202.16 (22 NYCRR 202.16).
Id. 5 202.17 (22 NYCRR 202.17).
Id. 4 202.22 (22 NYCRR 202.22).
The constitutional limits on jurisdiction were discussed by Professor Herzog in the
Survey's Conflict of Laws section. See Henog, Conflict of Laws, 1985 Survey of N.Y. Law,
36 SYRACUSE
L. REV.362, 363, 372 (1986).
140. 471 U.S. 462 (1985); see also Henog, supra note 139, a t 363. For a complete dimcuseion of the relevant constitutional considerations necessary for the assertion of jurisdicsupra note 29, a t 3 3.03 (1986); see also Asahi Metal
tion in New York, see CPLR M~NUAL,
Indue. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 39 Cal. 3d 35,702 P.2d 543,216 Cal. Rptr. 385, reu'd, 107
S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (a s t a t .court may not exercise jurisdiction over a case which both parties
are foreign and the only contact of the defendant with the state is through the indirect
atream of commerce; this recent decision will be discussed in the next edition of the
Survey).
141. See Burger King, 471 U.S. a t 462.
142. See id.
143. See id. a t 467.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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which was negotiated in Michigan, stipulated that the franchise relationship originated in Miami and would be governed by Florida
law."' The agreement also required that all monthly payments and
fees be forwarded to Florida and that the Miami headquarters
Moreover, the defendant's business partwould set all p01icies.l~~
~ the defendant purner attended training classes in F l ~ r i d a , "and
chased equipment from Fl~rida."~
When the defendant fell behind in his payments and negotiations to rectify the situation failed, the plaintiff brought suit in
Florida alleging jurisdiction pursuant to the Florida long-arm statute which conferred jurisdiction over any person who breaches a
contract in the state by failing to perform acts that the contract
~ ~ Supreme Court held that the exrequires to be ~ e r f 0 r m e d . lThe
ercise of jurisdiction did not offend due process because the defendant, a sophisticated businessman, had knowingly and intentionally reached out beyond Michigan and established a long-term
Thus, the Court held that
relationship with a Florida ~1aintiff.l'~
the defendant had established sufficient minimum contacts with
the former state to satisfy the purposeful availment
requirement.160
The Court also held that minimum contacts, which must comply with "fair play and substantial justice," may in appropriate
cases be considered in light of other factors which may serve to
establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing
of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required.161 The
Court defined these factors in terms of "the burden on the defendant," "the former State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,"
"the plaintiffs interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies," and the "shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."'" Thus, if a defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and burdens of a forum, he may still defeat jurisdiction, but the burden

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 465-66.
id. at 466.
id.
id. at 468.
id. at 479-80.
id. at 480-81.
id. at 481-84.
id. at 484.
id. at 462.
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shifts to him to present a compelling argument that some or all of
Similarly,
these factors would render jurisdiction unrea~onable.'~~
if the defendant's contacts with the forum are not sufficient to satisfy the purposeful availment requirements, the plaintiff may show
that some or all of these factors warrant a constitutional assertion
of the forum's jurisdi~tion.'~~
The effect of Burger K i n g l 6 9 n CPLR 302(a)(1)166remains
unclear. Although the case manifests an expansive approach for
contract-based transactions, it seems to be limited to franchise
agreernent~.'~~
Furthermore, the Burger King Court rejected the
notion that a forum could assert jurisdiction solely on the basis of
a single contact168which is a situation that an actual reading of
CPLR 302(a)(l)15Bseems to embrace. Nonetheless, the Burger
King rationale may be applicable to any national franchise entity.
The decision also f i r m s recent decisional law under CPLR
302(a)(l)le0which permits assertion of jurisdiction even if a defendant does not physically enter New York.161 Mail and wire communications are enough if the defendant has an ongoing relationship with the plaintiff.
It is clear that plaintiffs seeking to rely on Burger King16*in
New York must satisfy the state's long-arm statute and the state
and federal constitutions.1esThe relevant statute in New York is
CPLR 302(a)(1),le4which applies if the defendant "transacts any

153. See id. a t 481-84.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1987). CPLR 302(a)(l) states in pertinent part that "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . .who
. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state." See id.
157. See Siegel, U.S. Supreme Court, I n Case With Mixed Signals For New Yorkers,
Upholds Florida Long-arm Jurisdiction Against Michigan Burger King Franchisee, 308
N.Y. St. L. Dig., Aug. 1985, a t 1.
158. See Burger King, 471 U.S. a t 478. "If the question is whether an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish suilicient minimum contacts in the other party's home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot." See
id.
159. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l).
160. Id.
161. See CPLR MANUAL,
supra note 29, a t 3 306(b) (1986).
162. See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462.
163. See id.
164. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l).

..
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business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or
services in the state."lBSWhether contracting to make payments in
is questionable.
New York will by itself fit into CPLR 302(a)(l)lBB
In addition, while Burger King held that federal due process was
satisfied,lB7New York's constitution also has a due process clause
which, as the Court of Appeals has made clear, may require more
than its federal counterpart.lB8

B. Bases for Exercise of Jurisdiction
1. Attachment as the Basis for Jurisdiction

The practitioner should realize that even if a defendant's contacts with New York are of such a limited scope that he would not
be subject to the requirements of CPLR 302(a)(l)lBSor of 302 in
general, it may still be possible to obtain quasi in rem or "attachment" jurisdiction over him if his assets are located within the
state.170 In Banco Ambrosiano S.P.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust,
Ltd.,17' the plaintiff, an Italian banking corporation, sought to recover $15,000,000 allegedly loaned to the defendant, a Bahamas
In order to obtain jurisdiction, the plaintiff
banking ~orporation."~
attached $8,000,000 in the defendant's account with its correspondent New York bank.17s
In Banco Ambrosiano, negotiations concerning the loan agreement were made outside of New York, and neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant was authorized to do business in New York.17' The
defendant's sole contact with New York was the funds deposited
by the plaintiff in a New York bank account maintained by the
defendant and were to be repaid to another New York bank account.17The plaintiff conceded the lack of in personam jurisdic-

165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462.
168. See Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 408
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978).
169. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l).
170. See N.Y. CPLR 314(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
171. 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d 432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 68, 464 N.E.2d at 433, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
174. See id. at 69, 464 N.E.2d at 434, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
175. See id.
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t i ~ n . ' ?The
~ Court of Appeals upheld the exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction based on attachment of the defendant's New York
bank account, noting that CPLR 3021T7did not provide for in personam jurisdiction in every case in which due process would permit it. "Thus, a 'gap' exists in which the necessary minimum contacts, including the presence of defendant's property within the
state, are present, but personal jurisdiction is not authorized by
CPLR 302. It is appropriate, in such a case, to fill that gap utilizing
quasi in rem principle^."'^^
2. Long-Arm Jurisdiction

Two jurisdictional decisions during the Survey year are also
worthy of comment. In Morse Typewriter Co. v. Samandar Office
communication^,'^^ a subsidiary of the defendant was doing substantial business in New York and the question was whether the
parent corporation was subject to the jurisdiction of a New York
federal district court.180 The plaintiff argued that the parent was a
"corporate shell" or, in the alternative, that the subsidiary was a
"mere department" of the parent.lsl Judge Weinfeld held that a
defendant, which conducted most of its business through its various subsidiaries, could not be characterized as a corporate shell unless it did no business of its own, independent of its s~bsidiaries.'~~
Judge Weinfeld also explained that under CPLR 301 there are four
factors to use in an analysis of whether personal jurisdiction exists
over a parent corporation by virtue of the activities of its subsidiary in New York.lS3 The four factors are: common ownership, financial dependency of the subsidiary on the parent corporation,
the degree to which the parent interferes in the selection and assignment of the subsidiary's executive personnel and fails to observe corporate formalities, and the degree of the parent's control

176. See id. at 70,464 N.E.2d at 434, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
177. See N.Y. CPLR 302.
178. See Bunco Ambrosiano, 62 N.Y.2d at 71-72,464 N.E.2d at 435,476 N.Y.S.2d at 67
(citing SIEGEL,
N.Y. PRACTICE,
5 104, at 124 (1978)); Note,Minimum Contacts and Jurisdictional Theory in New York: The Effect of Shaffer v. Heitner, 42 ALB. L. REV.294, 306
(1978).
179. 629 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
180. See id. at 1151.
181. See id. at 1152.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1153.
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over the subsidiary's marketing and operational policies.'84 After
weighing all of the factors, Judge Weinfeld concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of in personam jurisdiction over the defendant under the
"doing business" doctrine.lS6The court held that for a subsidiary
to be a "mere department" of a parent requires that the parent
control "virtually every aspect [of the subsidiary's] marketing
efforts."lS6
The plaintiff in MorselB7also alleged long-arm jurisdiction
over one of the defendants under CPLR 301(a)(l) and (a)(3).lB8
Judge Weinfeld pointed out that none of the defendants' numerous contacts with the plaintiff constituted a transaction of business
within the state or a contract to supply goods in New York.18*
Judge Weinfeld also considered whether the ties between the defendant and another party established an agency relationship for
purposes of CPLR 301(a)(1).1s0Relying on George Reiner & Co. v.
Schwartz,lS1he held that in order to make out a prima facie case
of an agency relationship it must be shown that a defendant "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection
of its laws."ls2
With respect to personal jurisdiction under either 302(a)(3)(i)
or (ii),lsg Judge Weinfeld stressed that a tortious act without the
state, injuring the person or property within the state, does not
occur merely because the injured party is domiciled in New York
and sustains a financial loss.lS4New York is not the situs of the

184. See id. (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751
F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1984)).
185. See id.
186. See id. a t 1154 (citing Volkswagenwerk, 751 F.2d a t 122).
187. See id. a t 1150.
188. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l), (3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
189. See Morse, 629 F. Supp. a t 1152.
190. See id. a t 1156.
191. 41 N.Y.2d 648, 651, 363 N.E.2d 551, 553, 394 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1977).
192. See Morse, 629 F. Supp a t 1156 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)); see also Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 121 A.D.2d 870,503 N.Y.S.2d
792 (1st Dep't 1986) (long-arm statute, CPLR 302, does not preclude the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an agent who commits a tort while acting in the state on behalf of a
corporation).
193. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3).
194. See Morse, 629 F. Supp. a t 1156-57.
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injury, a t least in cases involving commercial torts, unless there is
an allegation that the tortious misrepresentation was made in New
York or was received and relied upon in New York, or that as a
result the plaintiff lost business in New York.lS6
In Rates Technology, Inc. v. Diosio,lB6 Judge McLaughlin
pointed out that the issue of personal jurisdiction must be determined separately for each cause of action asserted in the plaintiffs
complaint.lg7He also observed that Second Circuit federal district
courts have considerable leeway in deciding a pretrial motion to
A court may determine
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdicti~n.'~~
the motion on the basis of &davits alone, or it may permit discovery in aid of the motion, or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the motion.1ss If the court does not conduct a full blown hearing, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction; however, he must ultimately establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial hearing or at trial.200
In Rates,"O1 certain of the plainti£F's officers met with the defendants in New York for three to four hours.202Following further
negotiations, which occurred by telephone or a t meetings outside
of New York, the parties entered into a contract which one of the
defendants signed in Washington, D.C.203In assessing whether the
meeting in New York was sufficient for the assertion of long-arm
jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1),204Judge McLaughlin stressed
that the "relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has performed
'purposeful acts' in New York 'in relation to the contract, albeit

195. See id. a t 1157; see also Cooperstein v. Pan Oceanic Marine, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Nov.
14, 1986, at 15, col. 3 (2d Dep't 1986) (a Virginia savings and loan association cannot be
sued in a New York court on fraud and misrepresentation charges because the bank performed no purposeful acts in New York to justify long-arm jurisdiction).
196. 626 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
197. See id. at 1297.
198. See id.
199. See id.; see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 122 A.D.2d
630, 505 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st Dep't 1986) (if additional jurisdictionally related facts are required to establish jurisdiction, plaintiff can request discovery pursuant to CPLR 3211(d)
and the court must grant limited discovery if plaintiff can establish that jurisdictional facts
"may exist").
200. See Rates, 626 F. Supp. a t 1297.
201. See id. a t 1295.
202. See id. a t 1296.
203. See id.
204. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l).
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preliminarily or subsequent to its execution.' "305 Because the New
York meeting "concluded the substance of the agreement that
[formed] the hard core of [the] litigation,"e08the court held that
the meeting, which substantially advanced and was essential to the
formation of a contract, constituted a transaction of business in
New Y ~ r k . ~ ~ ~
With respect to the plaintiff's allegations of jurisdiction under
CPLR 302(a)(3),Po8Judge McLaughlin recognized the problems in
applying the "injury within the state" requirement to commercial
cases and concluded that an allegation of "loss of customers" by
the plaintiff satisfied the requirement.208He also directed the parties to brief the issue of the "fiduciary shield doctrine" for further
consideration by the court?'O This doctrine requires that the plaintiff establish that the agent act only in his corporate capacity
rather than in his own interest.=ll
C. Forum Selection Clauses

CPLR 327(b)=12was amended in 1984 to permit parties to
large commercial contracts to stipulate to: (1) the application of
New York substantive law to the parties' rights and duties, (2) the
parties' submission to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, and
(3) the entertainment of a matter by the New York courts whether
or not the forum non conveniens doctrine might otherwise dismiss

205. See Rates, 626 F. Supp. a t 1297-98 (quoting American Contract Designers, Inc. v.
Cliffside, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 735, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
206. See id. a t 1297 (quoting Trafalgar Capital Corp. v. Oil Producers Equip. Corp., 555
F. Supp. 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
207. See id. a t 1298. For discussion of recent federal cases reaching conflicting results
regarding liability to long-arm jurisdiction in breach of contract actions based upon meetings held in New York, see Berk v. Nemetz, 646 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Penthouse
Films Int'l, Ltd. v. Russell Films, Ltd., No. 86 Civ. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Berger v. Gorleck,
No. 85 Civ. 8609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Gates v. Pinnacle Communications, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 38
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
208. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3).
209. See Rates, 626 F. Supp. a t 1298.
210. See id.
211. See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 122 A.D.2d 614,504 N.Y.S.2d 915 (4th Dep't
1986) (Texas owner of Texas oil well development corporation, who acted in capacity as
corporate officer, rather than in his own interest, was protected by fiduciary shield doctrine
and, therefore, was not subject to personal jurisdiction of New York court under long-arm
statute).
212. See N.Y. CPLR 327 (McKiney Supp. 1987).
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the action.21sSeveral recent cases illustrate the usefulness of forum
selection clauses. In Credit Francais International, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera DeComercio, C.A.,214 the court asserted jurisdiction over non-resident parties whose only contact with New York
was a contractual agreement designating New York as a forum.
Similarly, in Rokeby-Johnson v. Kentucky Agricultural Energy
Corp.,PI5 the Appellate Division, First Department, recognized that
forum selection clauses must be a substantial factor in the determination of a proper forum. The Appellate Division, Second Department, confirmed during the Survey year that while "the availability of another suitable forum is not a prerequisite for applying
the doctrine of forum non conveniens," it is the most important
factor to be considered in determining whether to grant a defendant's CPLR 327218motion to dismiss.217

D. Statutory Requirements-Service of Summons
In view of the fact that decisional law during the Survey year
demonstrates that New York courts continue to require strict compliance for service of summons,218 it is useful to review CPLR
308.210
I . Service on a Natural Person
Personal service must be distinguished from personal delivery
213. See N.Y. CPLR 327(b); see also N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.
LAW$8 5-1401 & 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
214. 128 Misc. 2d 564, 573, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 678 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1985).
215. 108 A.D.2d 336, 340, 489 N.Y.S.2d 69, 73 (1st Dep't 1985).
216. See N.Y. CPLR 327.
217. See Broukhim v. Hay, 122 A.D.2d 9,10,504 N.Y.S.2d 467,468 (2d Dep't 1986); see
L. REV. 119, 134
also Henog, Conflict of Laws, 1984 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 SYRACUSE
(1985); Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV.325, 385 (1986);
Wise, Federal Judge Rules India is Forum for Bhopal Claims, N.Y.L.J., May 13,1986, a t 1,
col. 3.
218. See, e.g., Macchia v. Russo, 67 N.Y.2d 592, 496 N.E.2d 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d 591
(1986); De Zego v. Bruhn, 67 N.Y.2d 875, 492 N.E.2d 1217, 501 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1986); Rossetti v. DeLagana, 117 A.D.2d 793,499 N.Y.S.2d 117 (2d Dep't 1986); Ariowitsch v. Johnson, 114 A.D.2d 184, 498 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1986); Costa v. Franklin Gen. Hosp., 121
A.D.2d 368, 502 N.Y.S.2d 795 (2d Dep't 1986); Tiden Fin. Corp. v. Comm'n, 118 A.D.2d
848,500 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2d Dep't 1986); Monroe v. Albert Antor & Son Jewelers, 117 A.D.2d
657,498 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d Dep't 1986); Vogel v. Meixner, 119 A.D.2d 877,500 N.Y.S.2d 570
(3d Dep't 1986); Cornell v. Amell, 132 Misc. 2d 144,502 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co.
1986).
219. See N.Y. CPLR 308 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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of the summons to the defendant. The latter is one method of
"personal service upon a natural person" authorized by CPLR
308.220Under 308(1),P21 delivery of a summons may be accomplished by delivering it to the defendant or sometimes "by leaving
it in the general vicinity of a person to be served who resists service."22e Thus, when a defendant acknowledged his identity to a
process server, who pressed the buzzer of the defendant's apartment, service of process in the mail slot was s u f E ~ i e n tSimilarly,
.~~~
a process server, who was denied access to a defendant's residence
and later unsuccessfully pursued the defendant by foot to make
personal delivery of a summons, effected service under 308(1)344by
aflixing the summons under the defendant's windshield ~ i p e r . 4 ~ "
The Court of Appeals, however, held in Macchia v. R U S S O ~ ~ ~
that the delivery of a summons to the wrong person does not confer jurisdiction over a defendant, even though the summons shortly
thereafter comes into the possession of the party to be s e r ~ e d . 4In~ ~
Macchia, a summons was delivered to the defendant's son outside
the family house, and the son entered the house and gave the sumThe Court held that this "redelivery" was
mons to his
The Court, resting its decision on
not valid service under 308(1).2aB
the requirements of CPLR 308(1),PS0observed that "[wle see no
reason to extend the clear and unambiguous meaning of CPLR
308(1)."2s1
The Court of Appeals' message is clear. Strict compliance with
the service statute is required. The practitioner is obligated to debrief his process server and if there is any doubt as to whether
proper service has been made, service must be repeated in its origi-

220. See id.
221. See N.Y. CPLR 308(1) (McKiney Supp. 1987).
222. See Spector v. Berman, 119 A.D.2d 565, 500 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1986).
223. See id.
224. See N.Y. CPLR 308(1).
225. Union Nat'l Bank v. Pacamor Bearings, Inc., 132 Misc. 2d 269, 503 N.Y.S.2d 671
(Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1986).
226. 67 N.Y.2d 592, 496 N.E.2d 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1986).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 593, 496 N.E.2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
231. Id. (citing Espy v. Giorlando, 85 A.D.2d 652, 445 N.Y.S.2d 230 (2d Dep't 1981),
aff'd,56 N.Y.2d 640, 450 N.E.2d 193, 450 N.Y.S.2d (1982)).
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nal form or by alternative methods under CPLR 308.2s2Similarly,
the practitioner should not hesitate to use the sixty day toll of
CPLR 203(b)(5)(i),zssbut service should be made well before the
statute of limitations expires.
When there is a sworn denial of service under subdivision (1)
of section 308 by the defendant, the affidavit of service is rebutted
and the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence at a hearing. Decisions during the Survey year by the
Appellate Division, Second Department,zS4and by the Court of
Appealsas5impose a heavy burden on the moving party. This suggests that if there is any doubt that service has been completed
under 308(1),3s6the plaintiff should also use alternative methods of
service.as7Also during the Survey year, several trial courts liberally
interpreted 308(1)as8with respect to service of supplemental pleadingsas@
and service of an order to show cause in civil contempt proceeding~.~'~.
One appellate division has held that personal delivery
of an order to show cause is necessary for imposition of civil contempt sanctions.a41
2. Leave and Mail

CPLR 308(2)a4apermits service by leaving the papers with "a
232. See N.Y. CPLR 308; see also N.Y. CPLR 327(b); N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.
LAW$8 5-1401 &
5-1402.
233. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5)(i) ( M c K i e y Supp. 1987) (sixty day statute of l i i t a tions toll).
234. See Laurence v. Hillcrest Gen. Hasp.-GHI Group Health, Inc., 119 A.D.2d 808,
501 N.Y.S.2d 436 (2d Dep't 1986).
235. See DeZego v. Bruhn, 67 N.Y.2d 875,492 N.E.2d 1217, 501 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1986).
236. See N.Y. CPLR 308(1).
237. The plaintiffs affidavits of service muat contain the requisite factual and descriptive information to show that plaintiffs summons was delivered to the defendant personally.
Moreover, even if the affidavits are entitled only to a general presumption of regularity that
can be overcome by the defendant's sworn testimony, the credibility of the defendant's testimony that he was not personally served is determined "by the hearing court whose decieion should not be disturbed if supportable by a fair interpretation of the evidence." See
Laurence, 119 A.D.2d a t 808,501 N.Y.S.2d a t 436 (citing Feeney v. Booth Memorial Medical
Center, 109 A.D.2d 865, 866, 487 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (2d Dep't 1985)).
238. See N.Y. CPLR 308(1).
239. See Cooky's Island Steak Pub v. Yorkville Elec., 130 Mic. 2d 869, 497 N.Y.S.2d
1005 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1986).
240. See Department of How. Preservation & Dev. v. Arick, 131 Misc. 2d 950, 503
N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1986).
241. See Lu v. Betancourt, 116 A.D.2d 492, 496 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1st Dep't 1986).
242. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of abode"
of the defendant and by mailing the summons to the defendant at
If one of the two steps is omitted, the
his last known residen~e.2'~
service is invalid?'' In Roldan v. Th0rpe,3'~the Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that a landlord who lived on the second
floor of a house above the defendant's basement apartment qualified as a person of suitable age and discretion within the meaning
of CPLR 308(2).24sIn addition, the Second Department concluded
that because the defendant's apartment was not identifiable, service on the landlord on the first floor of his apartment constituted
service at the "actual dwelling place" or "usual place of abode" of
the
3. Service on Defendant's Agent

CPLR 308(3)24spermits service to be effected by delivery of
the summons to an agent "designated under rule 318."34s Although
there are no significant 1986 decisions interpreting CPLR 308(3),
one appellate division court has held that there are situations
where an unauthorized appearance by an attorney on behalf of a
resident of New York constitutes reason to vacate a judgment on
jurisdictional grounds?" In Skyline Agency, Inc. v. Ambrose Coppotelli, I n ~ . , 2 the
~ l Second Department extended the Court of Appeals' 1890 ruling in Vilas v. Plattsburgh & Montreal R.R.,s6s to
residents of the state who do not authorize an attorney to act on
their behalf.26s
243. See Bossuk v. Steinberg, 58 N.Y.2d 916,447 N.E.2d 56,460 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1983).
244. See id. It must also be noted that filing is necessary in order to effectuate service.
See N.Y. CPLR 308(2).
245. 117 A.D.2d 790, 499 N.Y.S.2d 114 (2d Dep't 1986).
246. See id. a t 792,499 N.Y.S.2d a t 117.
247. See id.; see also Percia v. Zdanowicz, 116 A.D.2d 558, 497 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep't
1986) (affirmation of defendant's counsel not suEcient to rebut plaintiffs attidavit of proper
service); accord Gill Cos. v. Gutierrez, 116 A.D.2d 696, 498 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2d Dep't 1986)
(hearing court's finding that plaintiffs process server was credible must be considered controlling on appeal).
248. See N.Y. CPLR 308(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
249. See id.
250. See Skyline Agency, Inc. v. Ambrose Coppotelli, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 135, 502
N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1986).
251. Id.
252. 123 N.Y. 44425 N.E. 941 (1890) (the Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction in the
case of an unauthorized appearance by an attorney on behalf of an out-of-state resident).
253. See id. a t 488, 25 N.E. a t 943; accord General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Salamone, 42
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4. Nail and Mail

If diligent efforts at making personal delivery or "leave and
mail" service have failed, CPLR 308(4)2Mpermits service to be
made "by affixing the summons to the door of either the actual
place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode" of the
defendant and by mailing the summons to his or her last known
residence.466Professor Farrell has recently alerted the bar to the
fact that the provisions of CPLR 308(4)a66have been so rigidly
construed by the courts so as to make the user of that statute almost always subject to a successful motion to dismiss on the
ground that service was not properly
He points out that
the due diligence mandated by the statute makes reliance upon
service under CPLR 308(4)368unusually hazardous and suggests
that to be on the safe side, one should supplement service under
CPLR 308(4)460with an application for "expedient" service under
CPLR 308(5).460It should be noted that nail and mail service requires proof of "due diligence" efforts to make service under
while service under CPLR 308(5)26Scan
CPLR 308(1)P61and (2),9@¶
be made if service is impracticable under CPLR 308(1),2a(2)266and
(4).466Professor Farrell's admonitions are justified by several appellate division decisions during the Survey year,es7 and by the

A.D.2d 506, 349 N.Y.S.2d 446 (3d Dep't 1973); see akio N.Y. CPLR 320 ( M c K i e y Supp.
1987).
254. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKiney Supp. 1987).
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. Farrell, Good Old Unreliable Service Under New York's Nail and Mail Statute,
N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
258. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4).
259. See id.
260. See id. 8 308(5).
261. See id. 5 308(1).
262. See id. 8 308(2).
263. See id. 8 308(5).
264. See id. 308(1).
265. See id. 308(2).
266. See id. 8 308(4).
267. See, e.g., Roesetti v. DeLagana, 117 A.D.2d 793,499 N.Y.S.2d 117 (2d Dep't 1986)
(process sewer's opportunity to serve person of suitable age and discretion at defendant's
place of business or residence and opportunity to mail copy to his last known residence
precluded "nail and mail" service); Coata v. Franklin Gen. Hosp., 121 A.D.2d 368, 502
N.Y.S.2d 795 (2d Dep't 1986) ("nail and mail" service invalid when process was placed on
the front door of a house in which the respondent had a separate and clearly marked office)
Ariowitach v. Johnson, 114 A.D.2d 184,498 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1986) ("nail and mail"
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's holding in Sterling v.
Environmental Control Board.ZB8
5. Expedient Service

Should personal delivery, "leave and mail" or "nail and mail"
service all prove, or appear to be, "impracticable," CPLR 308(5)s60
permits service to be made "in such manner as the court, upon
motion without notice, directs."270Although CPLR 308(5)971does
not require proof of due diligence or of actual prior attempts to
serve a party under each and every method provided in the statute:?* the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Saulo v.
No~mi:?~ rested its decision authorizing expedient service on the
fact that the plaintiff had tried to personally deliver the summons
to the defendant and thereafter made numerous inquiries as to his
~hereabouts??~
Thus, the practitioner should expect the "impracticable" requirements of CPLR 308(5)27sto be strictly construed.
6. Related Service Tips

Several decisions during the Survey year indicate that the
practitioner should be careful to follow the prescribed method of
service required by other provisions of the CPLR. For example,
service of process on a defendant-partnership should be pursuant
to CPLR 310,27ewhich mandates personal service within the state
upon any one of the partners??? Similarly, partnerships must remember to comply with General Business Law section 130 which

service invalid if effectuated a t the wrong apartment in the defendant's building).
268. 793 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1986) (court of appeals held that Chapter 623, formerly section 1404(d)(2) of the New York City Charter (nail and mail service statute), was unconstitutional as applied to absentee landlords because summons was not mailed to defendant's
last known address). A petition for certiorari was filed by the city in the United States
Supreme Court on October 6,1986.
269. See N.Y. CPLR 308(5).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 91 A.D.2d 1064,458 N.Y.S.2d 672
(2d Dep't 1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 283, 461 N.E.2d 1253, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1984).
273. 119 A.D.2d 657, 501 N.Y.S.2d 95 (2d Dep't 1986).
274. See id. a t 657, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 96.
275. See N.Y. CPLR 308(5).
276. See N.Y. CPLR 310 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
277. See Monroe v. Albert Antor & Son Jewelers, 117 A.D.2d 657,498 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d
Dep't 1986).
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requires that any change of address must be disclosed within thirty
days of the change.278Also, the service of a summons and complaint upon a real estate agent, who does not own the property,
without serving the executors of an estate who are available for
service, will invalidate a notice of pendency as to owners who
Similarly, improper
purchase the property from the executors.27@
service of process made under Vehicle and Traffic Law section
253280does not permit a party to rely on CPLR 317,281which is
only applicable to actions properly commenced under CPLR
308(2)-(5)P82
and CPLR 313,28sand to which the defendant did not
actually receive notice.284
Finally, the practitioner should also be wary of making service
by publication. This type of service is authorized in an action
based on in rem jurisdiction, and even there it is available only
when service cannot be made by another prescribed method. In
Caban v. Caban,P8YheAppellate Division, Third Department, invalidated a divorce decree obtained with service by publication
when one spouse had the other's army post office address and
made no effort to effect service through that address.288
IV. STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
A. Borrowing Statute

CPLR 202,287the borrowing statute, applies to actions brought
by non-residents based on causes of action which occurred outside
New York,le8These actions are subject to the limitations period of
New York and of the state in which they accrued and, thus, are
barred if either period has expired.P8@
Two federal district court

278. See Parks v. Steinbrenner, 115 A.D.2d 395, 496 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1st Dep't 1985).
279. See Vogel v. Meixner, 119 A.D.2d 877, 500 N.Y.S.2d 570 (3d Dep't 1986).
280. See N.Y. VEH.& TRAP. LAW8 253 (McKinney 1986).
281. See N.Y. CPLR 317 (McKinney 1986).
282. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2)-(5) (McKinney 1986).
283. See N.Y. CPLR 313 (McKinney 1986).
284. See Cornell v. Amell, 132 Misc. 2d 144, 502 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co.
1986) (defendant, improperly served under New York Vehicle and TrafEc Law section 253,
did not have to show he had a meritorious defense in order to vacate judgment).
285. 116 A.D.2d 783, 497 N.Y.S.2d 175 (3d Dep't 1986).
286. See id. a t 784, 497 N.Y.S.2d a t 176.
287. See N.Y. CPLR 202 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
supra note 29, a t 4 207.
288. See CPLR MANUAL,
289. See id.
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decisions during the Survey year have interpreted the statutory
meaning of accrual under CPLR 202.2B0
In Bank of Boston International v. Argue110 Tefel,BB1Judge
Glasser correctly pointed out that the New York Court of Appeals
has furnished little guidance in determining where a cause of action accrues for the purpose of the borrowing statute.2B2Judge
Glasser noted that the traditional doctrine holds that the place of
injury determines where a cause of action arises.2esIf this doctrine
were applicable, the plaintiffs action would have been time-barred;
however, the court held that Massachusetts was where the cause of
action accrued because the relevant breaches in the contract action
A
occurred when payments were not made in Massachu~etts.~~'
similar result was reached by Judge Weinfeld in Appel v. Kidder,
Peabody & C O . In
~ ~Appel,
~
trust beneficiaries of a Connecticut
corporation brought an action against a broker and its employee
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.4B6The court
looked to the laws of the forum state, New York, including its borrowing statute, because the 1934 Act does not provide a federal
statute of limitations on claims brought under section 10(b) of the
The defendant maintained that the applicable statute of
limitations was the two year Connecticut blue-sky limitation.BB8
The plaintiff argued that the applicable statute was the six year
limitation period for fraud claims in New York.BBB
Judge Weinfeld
framed the question as:
[Wlhether the New York borrowing statute should be applied,
and this determination depends upon where the cause of action
accrued. For the purposes of the New York borrowing statute, the
cause of action accrued where the loss was sustained. Where, as
here, the harm claimed is economic, the loss is sustained when
the economic impact of the defendant's conduct is felt, usually

290. See N.Y. CPLR 202.
291. 626 F. Supp. 314 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
292. See id. at 316-17;see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740,
801 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
293. See Bank of Boston Int'l, 626 F. Supp. at 317.
294. See id.
295. 628 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
296. See id. at 155.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
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but not invariably at the plaintiff's place of residence.s00

Although the loss was sustained in New York where the corpus of
the trust was located, Judge Weinfeld held that the economic loss,
if any, resulting from the defendant's alleged conduct was felt in
C o n n e c t i c ~ tThus,
. ~ ~ ~ under CPLR 202,902 the Connecticut limitation period would govern.s0s
Another important decision during the Survey year which relates to CPLR 202s04is Rossi v. E d Peterson Cutting Equipment
C ~ r p The
. ~ ~plaintiff,
~
a New York resident, brought a products
liability action for injuries sustained from a paper cutting machine
. ~ ~ defendant
~
asserted an affirmative
in Stamford, C o n n e c t i c ~ tThe
defense that the claims were barred by the applicable Connecticut
statute of limitations.s07In support of its motion, the defendant
argued "that because the plaintiff traveled every day to Connecticut to work, was employed by a Connecticut company, was injured
and was treated in Connecticut, Connecticut ha[d] the most significant contacts with the case, and therefore the substantive law of
that state sh[ould] govern."s08 The court rejected the defendant's
CPLR
argument and held that CPLR 202s08 was
202811 directs that when a cause of action accrues outside New
York in favor of a New York resident, the three year statute of
limitations under CPLR 214(5)s12is applicable.s1s

B. Equitable Estoppel
Despite the prohibition against judicial extension of statutes
of limitation^,^" courts have the power to prevent a defendant
from asserting a time-bar if it would be inequitable to do so. In

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 155-56.
See id. at 156.
See N.Y. CPLR 202.
See Appel, 628 F. Supp. at 156.
See N.Y. CPLR 202.
131 Misc. 2d 31, 498 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1986).
See id. at 33, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
See id. at 34, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
Id. at 33,498 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
See N.Y. CPLR 202.
See Rossi, 131 Misc. 2d at 33, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
See N.Y. CPLR 202.
See N.Y. CPLR 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
See Rossi, 131 Misc. 2d at 33, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
See N.Y. CPLR 201 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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this respect, several Survey year decisions, none of which apply the
doctrine, should be mentioned.
First, equitable estoppel will be applied against governmental
o n doctrine
d,
is inapagencies only in exceptional c a s e ~ . ~ ~ ~ e cthe
plicable if the plaintiff fails to specifically allege that he deferred
commencing an action until after expiration of the statutory period
because of reliance on fraudulent misrepresentations of the def e n d a r ~ tThird,
. ~ ~ ~ the plaintiff must exercise due diligence when he
seeks the shelter of the doctrine.s17

C. Relation of Claim in Amended Pleadings
CPLR 203(e)s18 provides that added claims in amendments
permitted by leave of the court are timely unless the original claim
did not give notice of the transactions or occurrences "to be proved
pursuant to the amended pleading. The test is whether a party will
~ ~this
~ respect, during the Survey year the apbe p r e j u d i ~ e d . "In
pellate divisions liberally construed CPLR 203(e)Sa0to permit
amendment of pleadings.821Nonetheless, it is clear that mere notice of transactions or occurrences to be proved, independent of
the original pleadings, is inadequate.see
Mention should also be made of the Court of Appeals decision
in Duffy v. Horton Memorial Hospital.szs The Court held that a

315. See DiGeloromo v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 116 A.D.2d 691, 691, 498
N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (2d Dep't 1986).
316. See Valenti v. Trunfio, 118 A.D.2d 480, 483, 499 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (1st Dep't
1986); McIvor v. DiBenedetto, 121 A.D.2d 519,520,503 N.Y.S.2d 836,837 (2d Dep't 1986);
Raiis v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 120 A.D.2d 509,509, 501 N.Y.S.2d 709,710 (2d Dep't
1986).
317. Schroeder v. Brooklyn Hosp., 119 A.D.2d 564, 500 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (2d Dep't
1986); Roe v. Bonura, 132 Misc. 2d 390, 394, 503 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co.
1986).
318. See N.Y. CPLR 203(e) (McKinney 1972).
319. See S ~ G E L
NEW
, YORKPRACTICE,
supra note 110, 8 237.
320. See N.Y. CPLR 203(e).
321. See Bobrick v. Bravstein, 116 A.D.2d 682, 497 N.Y.S.2d 749 (2d Dep't 1986);
Grosse v. Friedman, 118 A.D.2d 539, 498 N.Y.S.2d 863 (2d Dep't 1986); Muntner v. Lane,
116 A.D.2d 702, 498 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2d Dep't 1986); Schuler v. Grand Metro Bldg. Corp.. 118
A.D.2d 633, 499 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep't 1986); March v. St. Volodymyr Ukranian Catholic
Church, 117 A.D.2d 864,498 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2d Dep't 1986) (plaintiff entitled to amend complaint to add lost earnings in addition to lost wages).
322. Glatzer v. Scappatura, 116 A.D.2d 697,498 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2d Dep't 1986); Shapiro
v. Schoninger, 122 A.D.2d 38, 504 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1986).
323. 66 N.Y.2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 820, 497 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1985).
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plaintiffs amendment to assert a direct claim against an impleaded party can be deemed interposed as of the time the party
was first impleaded by the defendanLS2' Whether or not to allow
the amendment depends on whether the third party defendant can
show any operative prejudice.s26

D. Discovery of Foreign Objects and Continuous Treatment
Doctrine
Medical and dental actions are governed by CPLR 214-a.s26
This provision, amended on July 21, 1986, also applies to actions
for podiatric malpractice.s27 Actions covered by CPLR 214-as28
must be brought within two years and six months of the act or
omission at issue.s2g Exceptions are provided for cases involving
the discovery of foreign objects and for actions commenced after a
period of continuous treatment.ss0
The applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine requires that there be more than merely a continuing relationship
between the physician and the patient.ss1 The underlying rationale
is the existence of a "continuing trust and confidence" which warrants the tolling of the limitations period.ss2 In this respect, courts
during the Suruey year restrictively read CPLR 214-a.33s Thus,
continuous treatment contemplates "scheduled appointments" for
"future visits" and not merely a written request by a physician to
In adsee his patient seven months after surgery was perf~rmed.~~'
dition, absent a clear agency relationship, the doctrine cannot be

324. See id. a t 478, 488 N.E.2d a t 823, 497 N.Y.S.2d a t 893.
325. See id.
326. See N.Y. CPLR 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1987).
327. See Act of July 21,1986, ch. 485,209 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1072 (to be
codified a t N.Y. CPLR 214 (McKinney Supp. 1987)).
328. See N.Y. CPLR 214-a.
329. See id.
330. See CPLR MANUAL,
supra note 29, 3 2.18(e)(3).
331. See infra notes 332-36 and accompanying text.
332. See Richardson v. Orentreich, 64 N.Y.2d 896, 898, 477 N.E.2d 210, 211, 487
N.Y.S.2d 731,732 (1985) (citing Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939,940,463 N.E.2d 371,372,
474 N.Y.S.2d 970, 971 (1984)).
333. See N.Y. CPLR 214-a.
334. See DePeralta v. Presbyterian Hosp, 121 A.D.2d 346,503 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't
1986). But see Ward v. Kaufman, 120 A.D.2d 929,502 N.Y.S.2d 883 (4th Dep't 1986) (doctor's telephone call to plaintiff approximately two weeks after he applied a left tibial cast
brace to her leg qualified as continuous treatment).
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imputed from one doctor to another.ss6 Finally, treatment is not
considered continuous when the interval between treatments exceeds the two and one half year limitation period.ss6
If a foreign object has been left in the patient's body, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the patient could have
reasonably discovered the malpractice.ss7 If the exception applies,
the action must be commenced within one year of the actual or
The major case decided during the Survey
imputed
year was Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc.,SSewhere the Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice
action based on a malfunctioning prosthetic device begins to run
when the device is installed and not from the time a patient is
injured.s40The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that an imThe court rested
planted device was a foreign object e~ception.8'~
its decision on a narrow reading of CPLR 214-as'% which specifically excludes prosthetic devices from the excepti0n.3'~Apparently
intrauterine devices still qualify, at least in some courts, for the
foreign object exception rule.s44

E. Proceedings Against Body or Officers
No prior edition of the Survey has reminded the practitioner
of the obvious-there is a four month statute of limitations for a
proceeding against a body or officer after the determination to be
reviewed becomes final or binding upon the petitioner.s46 Several

335. See Modzelewski v. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center, 120 A.D.2d 498, 501
N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d Dep't 1986); see also Otero v. Presbyterian Hoep., 116 A.D.2d 511, 497
N.Y.S.2d 381 (1st Dep't 1986); Meath v. Mihrick, 120 A.D.2d 327, 501 N.Y.S.2d 350 (let
Dep't 1986).
336. See Sherry v. Queens Kidney Center, 117 A.D.2d 663,664,498 N.Y.S.2d 401,402
(2d Dep't 1986).
337. See supra note 39.
338. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
339. 67 N.Y.2d 120, 491 N.E.2d 1097, 500 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1986).
340. See id. a t 123, 491 N.E.2d a t 1098, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 641. The plaintiff received a
total hip replacement during an operation in 1973. The femoral component of the implant
broke in 1981. Two years later, the plaintiff sued the doctor and the manufacturer. See id.
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See, e.g., Mayotte v. Bauer, 130 Misc. 2d 946,497 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1986); Taddeucci v. Weitzner, 130 Misc. 2d 853, 497 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct.,
Queens Co. 1986).
345. See N.Y. CPLR 217 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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cases this year indicate, however, that there is some confusion as to
when the period is applicable and when it begins to run. The four
month period is inapplicable if the body or officer is acting in its
legislative capacity.s46Thus, an Article 78 proceeding challenging
the constitutionality of an administrative regulation is subject to a
six year statute of limitations rather than a four month period.347
Similarly, the limitation under CPLR 217348 commences to
run-becomes "final" and "bindingv-as soon as the aggrieved
party is notified, and not when the action directed by the determination is taken.s4s

F. Miscellaneous
During the Survey year, some other decisions emerged that
merit a t least brief mention.

1. Toll by Reason of Insanity
In Kelly v. Solvay Union Free School District,S60 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that a hearing must be
held to determine if a mentally handicapped individual was suffering from insanity under CPLR 208.s61 The Fourth Department
pointed out that there were no cases dealing specifically with
mental retardation as a condition of insanity.s62It concluded that,
because CPLR 208s" does not define the term but applies "to only
those individuals who are unable to protect their legal rights be-

346. See Norman v. Town Bd., 118 A.D.2d 839, 500 N.Y.S.2d 324 (2d Dep't 1986);
Chandler v. Coughlin, 131 Misc. 2d 442,500 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1986), rev'd
sub nom., I n re Chandler, - N.Y.S.2d - (1987).
347. See Chandler, 131 Misc. 2d a t 445, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 630.
348. See N.Y. CPLR 217.
349. See Edmead v. McGuire, 67 N.Y.2d 714, 714-15, 490 N.E.2d 853, 854, 499
N.Y.S.2d 934, 935 (1986). The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's claim because,
even though the respondent's action did not become final until October 27, 1982, he was
unequivocally notified of the respondent's action on September 8, 1982 and then sought
relief five months later. See id.; see also Gerasimou v. Ambach, 636 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D.N.Y.
1986); Rappo v. New York Human Resources Admin., 120 A.D.2d 339,501 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1st
Dep't 1986); Carroll v. Gunn, 116 A.D.2d 686,497 N.Y.S.2d 753 (2d Dep't 1986); Dionisio v.
Board of Educ., 118 A.D.2d 854,500 N.Y.S.2d 343 (3d Dep't 1986); Barner v. JeffenonvilleYoungsville Cent. School Dist., 117 A.D.2d 162,502 N.Y.S.2d 285 (3d Dep't 1986).
350. 116 A.D.2d 1006, 498 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep't 1986).
351. See N.Y. CPLR 208 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
352. See Kelly, 116 A.D.2d a t 1006, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 935.
353. See N.Y. CPLR 208.
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cause of an overall inability to function in society," a handicapped
person may qualify for the insanity toll under CPLR 208.364
2. Toll by CPLR 215(8)
CPLR 215(8)365was added in 1983 and provides for a one year
toll of the statute of limitations when it is shown that a criminal
action has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a civil claim arises. In Von Bulow u. Von BuZ O W , ~ the
~ ~ court held that CPLR 215(8)367is available only to those
. ~ tolling
~ ~
who are victims of crimes prosecuted in New Y ~ r k The
provision was not available to a New York victim because Claus
Von Bulow was prosecuted in C o n n e c t i c ~ t . ~ ~ ~
3. CPLR 214-a

If a chiropractor's services constitute medical treatment he
will be subject to a two and one-half year statute of limitations
instead of a three year period.360Similarly, a patient suing a hospital for injuries he sustains as a result of the negligence of hospital
personnel-non doctors-is governed by a three year statute of
limitations for negligence, and not two and one-half years for medical malpractice.361
4. Toll for Civil Rights Actions Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

New York's three-year limitations period for personal injury
actions (CPLR 214(5))36egoverns in civil rights actions under 42
U.S.C. section 1983.883This is true even though New York provides
a one-year statute for actions arising from assault, battery, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel or slander.364

354. See Kelly, 116 A.D.2d a t 1006, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 935.
355. See N.Y. CPLR 215(8) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
356. 634 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
357. See N.Y. CPLR 215(a).
358. See Von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. a t 1299.
359. See id.
360. See Foote v. Picinich, 118 A.D.2d 156, 503 N.Y.S.2d 926 (3d Dep't 1986).
361. See White v. Sheehan Memorial Hosp., 119 A.D.2d 989, 500 N.Y.S.2d 885 (4th
Dep't 1986); Coursen v. New York Hosp.-Cornell Medical Center, 114 A.D.2d 254, 499
N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dep't 1986).
362. See N.Y. CPLR 214(5) (McKinney 1972).
363. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
364. See Okure v. Owens, 625 F. Supp. 1568 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 106 1987-1988

19871

Civil Practice

The Survey has yet to highlight recent decisional law expanding the scope of claim preclusion365and issue preclusion3ss in
New York. Both doctrines, which may be invoked offensively and
defensively, are being increasingly applied by courts to bar parties
from having their day in court.3s7

A. Claim Preclusion
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on
the merits bars a subsequent action between the parties, or persons
in privity with them, from re-litigating the same cause of action. It
bars the re-litigation of issues which might have been litigated, as
well as those which actually were litigated. The "might have been"
requirement has been substantially broadened by the Court of App e a l ~ Thus,
. ~ ~ ~the doctrine is operative even if a party in a second
action raises a plausible ground for relief that was not raised in the
first action. New facts and new theories, whatever they might be,

365. Claim preclusion or res judicata is the doctrine that once a claim is brought to a
final conclusion all other claims, including those which might have been litigated, which
arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon
different theories or if seeking a different remedy. See generally 5 WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER,
supra note 44, a t 8 5011.10-5011.22 (1985).
366. Modern approaches generally refer to collateral estoppel as "issue preclusion." See
generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OP JUDGMENTS,
Chapter 3 (1957). The principle of collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of factual issues that a court decided in a prior suit. See
supra note 44, 8 5011.23. New York courts have
generally 5 WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER.
adopted the modern terminology set forth in the Restatement Second. See In re American
Ins. Co., 143 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2, 371 N.E.2d 798, 801 n.2, 401 N.Y.S.2d 36, 39 n.2 (1977).
367. For examples of claim preclusion, see O'Brien v. Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 429
N.E.2d 1158, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1981); Smith v. Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185, 429
N.E.2d 746,445 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1981); see also Note, The Expansion of Res Judicata in New
York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 210 (1983). For examples of issue preclusion, see Straws v. Belle
Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399,482 N.E.2d 34,492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985); Kaufman v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 482 N.E.2d 63, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1985); Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d
746, 481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985); Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d
548,468 N.E.2d 1,479 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1984); Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,467
N.E.2d 487,478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984); see generally Siegel, Expanding Applications of Collateral Estoppel, 309 & 310 N.Y. ST.L. DIG., Sept. & Oct., 1985.
368. See O'Brien, 54 N.Y.2d a t 353, 429 N.E.2d a t 1158, 445 N.Y.S.2d a t 687. In this
decision, the Court of Appeals fully adopted the Restatement (Second) of Judgments transactional analysis approach. This requires that "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion,
all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even
if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." See id. a t 357,429 N.E.2d
a t 1159, 445 N.Y.S.2d a t 688.
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are barred if a party could have initially raised them. This has
great significance for the practitioner who must endeavor to include every possible theory of relief in his first pleading. It also
contemplates diligent investigation by the lawyer to discover all
relevant facts the first time around.
During the Survey year, the doctrine of claim preclusion was
applied in a variety of contexts. In El Sawah v. Penfield Mechanical Contractors, Inc.,SB9the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, applied the doctrine to dismiss the plaintifF's action based
on breach of contract and negligence. In a prior action instituted
by the defendant to collect the balance due on a plumbing contract, the plaintiff (then defendant) interposed two counterclaims
seeking damages for negligent performance of the contract.870Because the counterclaims were dismissed, the plaintiff was barred
The
from raising them in a second action based on negligen~e.~?'
Fourth Department pointed out that in determining whether
causes of action are the same as those asserted in a prior action, a
transactional analysis is utilized.s72Thus, "once a claim is brought
to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy."s7s
Claim preclusion has also been applied to a surrogate's decree
barring a demand for arbitration arising out of the same transact i ~ n . ~ ?In' Reed, a surrogate's settlement decree providing that a
settlement was intended to encompass all of the issues raised or
which could have been raised in litigation was entitled to preclu? ~ was true
sive effect so as to bar a demand for a r b i t r a t i ~ n . ~This
even though some of the alleged wrongdoings asserted in the arbitration demand occurred after the plaintiff had filed a supplemental complaint in the prior action.s76
In Hodes v. A ~ e l r o d : ~the
~ Court of Appeals had previously
annulled the revocation of petitioners' certificates of relief from

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

119 A.D.2d 980, 500 N.Y.S.2d 878 (4th Dep't 1986).
See id. at 981, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Reed v. Cohen, 120 A.D.2d 598, 502 N.Y.S.2d 497 (2d Dep't 1986).
See id. at 598, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
See id.
116 A.D.2d 75, 500 N.Y.S.2d 379 (3d Dep't 1986).

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 108 1987-1988

19871

Civil Practice

109

civil disabilities and forfeitures. Thereafter, the legislature
amended Public Health Law section 2806(5)378and made it retroactive for the purpose of avoiding the result reached by the Court
of Appeals.S7BThe Commissioner of Health then commenced new
proceedings to revoke the petitioners' certificates.3s0The Appellate
Division, Third Department, held that the second action was
barred by claim preclusion and rejected the respondent's contention that decisional law creates an exception to the application of
claim preclusion when there is a subsequent change in the law underlying the initial adjudicati~n.~~'
Similarly, in Burns v. Eganss3
the plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed under the doctrine of claim
preclusion.383In a prior action, the court held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue under the State Finance Law Article 7-A,
and, therefore, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held
that they were precluded from asserting an alternative basis for
standing as voters in a second action.3s4Moreover, in Partlow v.
Kolupa,JS6the Appellate Division, Third Department, applied the
doctrine to hold that a former spouse's failure to assert a conversion claim in a prior action precluded re-litigation of disputed equitable distribution issues.386
Although several appellate division decisions have qualified
the general trend in New York is for courts to
the doctrine's u~e,8~'
Thus, practitioners should exliberally apply claim preclusi0n.9~~
plore every possible theory of relief available before filing the initial complaint. Similarly, if subsequent investigation or disclosure
yields additional facts upon which to base a new claim, a motion to
amend the complaint should be made immediately.

378. See N.Y. PUB.HEALTH
LAW8 2806(5) (McKiney Supp. 1987).
379. See Hodes, 116 A.D.2d at 76, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 79, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
382. 117 A.D.2d 38, 501 N.Y.S.2d 742 (4th Dep't 1986).
383. See id.
384. See id. at 42, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
385. 122 A.D.2d 509, 504 N.Y.S.2d 870 (3d Dep't 1986).
386. See id.
387. See Wald v. Wald, 119 A.D.2d 569, 500 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1986); Abdella v.
NeJame, 120 A.D.2d 793, 501 N.Y.S.2d 528 (3d Dep't 1986); Kleinberger v. Sharon, 116
A.D.2d 367, 501 N.Y.S.2d 746 (3d Dep't 1986).
388. See supra note 387.
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B. Issue Preclusion
During the past two years the Court of Appeals has expanded
Throughout the Survey year
the doctrine of issue preclusi0n.8~~
courts have continued to apply the doctrine in a variety of
As the doctrine now stands, a valid final judgmentSB1on the
meritssB.2rendered by a forum of competent jurisdiction prevents
re-litigation by the parties, or their privies,sBsof matters of fact or
law actually litigated or necessarily deterrnined,sB4in the earlier action. Two prerequisites must be met. "First the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive
of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded . . .
must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior
determinati~n."~~~

389. See Koch, 62 N.Y.2d a t 548,468 N.E.2d a t 1,479 N.Y.S.2d a t 163. In an action by
a grocer for property damage caused by the 1977 New York City blackout, Consolidated
Edison (Con. Ed.) was found to be grossly negligent. See id. This finding was later given
preclusive effect in a multimillion dollar damage suit brought against Con. Ed. by New York
City Mayor Edward Koch and public benefit corporations. See id.; Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d at 494,
467 N.E.2d a t 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 823 (preclusive effect given to administrative findings
made in unemployment insurance proceeding to estop plaintiff from maintaining a plenary
damage suit for slander, false arrest and wrongful discharge); Clemens, 65 N.Y.2d at 746,
481 N.E.2d a t 560,492 N.Y.S.2d a t 20 (issue preclusion applied to no fault arbitral determination to bar plaintiff from re-litigating whether his herniated disc condition was causually
related t o an automobile accident); see also Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 65 N.Y.2d 189,
488 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
390. See Genova v. Southhampton, 776 F.2d 1560 (2d Cir. 1986) (disciplinary hearing);
Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 638 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (criminal proceeding); Meyn v.
Meyn, 119 A.D.2d 644, 501 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dep't 1986) (matrimonial action); Rella v.
State, 117 A.D.2d 591,498 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1986) (contract action); Ford v. Ford, 118
A.D.2d 1004, 500 N.Y.S.2d 373 (3d Dep't 1986) (action for arrearages).
391. See Dunleavy v. Fit American Title Ins. Co., 117 A.D.2d 952, 499 N.Y.S.2d 264
(3d Dep't 1986); Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Facilities Dev. Corp., 115 A.D.2d 48,
499 N.Y.S.2d 820 (3d Dep't 1986).
392. See Furia v. Furia, 116 A.D.2d 694, 498 N.Y.S.2d 12 (2d Dep't 1986) (breach of
contract action not barred by prior actions, one of which had been dismissed for insufficiency of the pleadings, one of which had been abandoned, and one of which had been
dismissed for lack of in personam jurisdiction); Holley v. Mandate Realty Corp., 121 A.D.2d
202, 503 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1st Dep't 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute is not on the
merits).
393. See Home of Histadruth Ivrith, Inc. v. State Facilities Dev. Corp., 114 A.D.2d 200,
498 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dep't 1986); National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 117 A.D.2d 948, 499 N.Y.S.2d 260 (3d Dep't 1986).
394. See Freeport v. Sanders, 121 A.D.2d 429, 503 N.Y.S.2d 128 (2d Dep't 1986).
395. Kaufman, 65 N.Y.2d a t 449,482 N.E.2d a t 67,492 N.Y.S.2d a t 588.
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The identity of issue requirement has been the subject of considerable litigation in New Y ~ r k . ~
Nonetheless,
@~
a review of the
record in the first action will usually determine if an issue necessary to a final judgment on the merits is the same as an issue decisive to the second action. Thus, if the legal theory in both actions
is the same and if there are no significant differences in the facts
upon which both theories are based, identity of issue is generally
satisfied.sn7This is true even when many persons assert claims
against the same defendant which arise from one transaction or
Satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity test requires examination of a number of factors articulated by the Court of Ap@ ~ factors include:
peals in Koch v. Consolidated Edison C O . ~These
the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of
initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a
compromise verdict, differences in the applicable law, and foreseeability of future litigation.'OO The full and fair opportunity requirement extends beyond terms of traditional notions of due process.'O1
It also prohibits the application of issue preclusion if a forum in
the second action affords a party, against whom preclusion is invoked, new procedural opportunities which could result in the
same issue being determined differently.'OP Several decisions during the Survey year applied issue preclusion and are worthy of
mention.
In Preview Construction Co. v. Roth,'Os the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a plaintiffs action to recover
damages for conversion and intentional interference with contract
was barred by issue preclu~ion.'~'In the prior action, plaintiff had
sued Roth and another defendant for intentional interference, but

3%.
397.
1975).
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

See 5 WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER.
supra n 0 k 44, 8 5011.26.
See id. But see Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211,377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't
See Koch, 62 N.Y.2d a t 548, 468 N.E.2d a t 1, 479 N.Y.S.2d a t 163.

Id. a t 550,468 N.E.2d a t 3, 479 N.Y.S.2d a t 165.
See id.
See People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58,417 N.E.2d 518, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1980).
See Koch, 62 N.Y.2d a t 554, 468 N.E.2d a t 7, 479 N.Y.S.2d a t 169.

117 A.D.2d 591, 498 N.Y.S.2d 62 (2d Dep't 1986).
See id.
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the court concluded that no valid contract existed.'06 Therefore,
the Second Department barred not only the re-litigation of the
contract claim but also concluded that because the evidence
presented by the plaintiff in the first action would not support a
cause of action against the respondents for conversion, that claim
could not be re-litigated.'Oe
In Ford u. Fordto7the Appellate Division, Third Department,
applied the doctrine to bar a wife's motion seeking a money judgment for arrearages.'08 A judgment of divorce had been entered
against the defendant upon his default in September of 1977.'Oe
Thereafter, the defendant paid the plaintiff a reduced biweekly
sum in maintenance and child support for seven years.'1° When the
defendant won a substantial amount of money in the state lottery,
the plaintiff moved to punish him for contempt for failing to pay
the full amount of maintenance and support."' Special Term denied the motion and held that plaintws conduct in accepting the
reduced payments for seven years operated as a waiver.41PThe
plaintiff did not appeal the order but filed a separate action for
arrearages.'ls The Third Department pointed out that the only issue decided in the prior motion was that plaintiff did not have a
claim for arrearages.'14 The court concluded that "all the elements
of [issue preclusion] are present" and applied the doctrine.'lS
Similarly, in Meyn v. MeynF6 the plaintiff's action for divorce
on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment was barred by issue
preclusion because the same decisive facts had been necessarily determined against her after a full and complete hearing in a prior
action regarding execution of a separation agreement.'17 The Appellate Division, Second Department, rested its decision on the
fact that the record for the prior hearing indicated that the deci-

405. See id.
406. See id.
407. 118 A.D.2d 1004, 500 N.Y.S.2d 373 (3d Dep't 1986).
408. See id.
409. See id.
410. See id.
411. See id.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. See id.
416. 119 A.D.2d 644, 501 N.Y.S.2d 89 (2d Dep't 1986).
417. See id. at 645, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
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sive issues of fraud and deceit had already been litigated."ls
In White u. Burke,"@ both parties sought a declaratory judgment in the supreme court to determine the status of their comThe court applied issue preclusion on the
mon law relati~nship.'~~
bounds that a prior decision by the family court had concluded
that the parties were common law husband and wife.'21 The court
applied issue preclusion because the procedures followed by the
family court were not significantly different from those which
would be utilized by the supreme court in a declaratory judgment
C. Administrative and Arbitral Determinations
During the Survey year, several decisions have qualified Ryan
v. New York Telephone CO.'~~
and Clemens u. A~ple,'~'both of
which expanded the doctrine of issue preclusion to administrative
and arbitral determinations. Ryan and Clemens should be analyzed because they have not previously been discussed in the
Survey.
In Ryan, the plaintiff had been discharged from the employ of
the New York Telephone Company after being arrested for theft of
company property.425His arrest was based on testimony from two
security investigators who claimed that Ryan had removed company property from the workplace.'28 After his discharge, Ryan applied for unemployment insurance benefits, but his application was
rejected by a claims examiner on the ground that the discharge
Ryan filed an administrawas the result of his own mis~onduct.'~~
tive appeal and was granted a hearing before the Unemployment
After considering
Insurance Administrative Law Judge (L~LJ).'~~

418. See id.
419. 131 Misc. 2d 59, 498 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct., Saratoga Co. 1986).
420. See id.
421. See id.
422. See id. at 60, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
423. 62 N.Y.2d 494,467 N.E.2d 487,478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984); see also Carlisle, Getting
a Free Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of Law, 55 FORDHAM
L. REV.63
(1986).
424. 65 N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560,492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985).
425. See Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d at 497,467 N.E.2d at 489,478 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
426. See id. at 498, 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
427. See id.
428. See id.

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 113 1987-1988

114

Syracuse Law Review

[vol. 38:67

the testimony of Ryan and one hearsay witness, the ALJ sustained
the ruling of the claims examiner and found that "claimant was
seen . . . removing company property."42s As a result of the finding
that Ryan had stolen the property, the ALJ concluded that he was
The ALJ then afterminated because of his own miscond~ct.'~~
firmed the denial of Ryan's unemployment benefits.'81 This determination was affirmed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Board, and was later upheld by the appellate division.'82
After criminal charges against Ryan were dismissed in the interests of justice, but before the appellate division's affirmance of
the administrative determination, Ryan filed a tort action for
wrongful discharge and slander.'8s The defendant moved to dismiss this action on the ground that it was based on the issue of
Ryan's misconduct which had already been litigated at the administrative hearing.'s4 The motion was denied by special term and
affirmed by the appellate division.485
When the case reached the Court of Appeals, it reversed the
lower court's decision and held that issue preclusion applied.'86
The Court found that there was an identity of issue because it was
logically inconsistent for Ryan, who had lost on the issue of his
misconduct in the administrative proceeding, to later claim that he
had been falsely accused of taking property or that he had been
unjustifiably terminated.'s7 The issue was material to the administrative determination and decisive of the claims raised by Ryan in
his lawsuit.'88 The Court pointed out that Ryan had testified on
his own behalf and, through his union representative, Ryan crossexamined the defendant's witnesses at the hearing.'8s Thus, the
Court held that the realities of the prior litigation had been sufficiently extensive and adversarial to constitute a full and fair hearingFOIn addition, the Court relied on the fact that the adminis-

429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 499, 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 502-03, 467 N.E.2d at 491-92, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28.
id. at 502,467 N.E.2d at 491,478 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
id.
id. at 505, 467 N.E.2d at 493, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
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trative hearing was presided over by an ALJ, that the hearing was
voluntarily initiated by Ryan, that he knowingly chose not to appear with legal counsel, and that the record demonstrated that the
administrative procedure was fair and that Ryan had a full opportunity to litigate the issue of misconduct.441
In Clemens, the issue was whether a herniated disc condition
was causally related to an automobile accident which occurred in
December of 1977.442Two years after the accident, Clemens underwent surgery for removal of the disc and then sought no-fault insurance benefits of $1,798.02 to cover the costs of surgeryf13 The
plaintiffs carrier denied the benefits on the grounds that the herniated disc was not caused or aggravated by the car accident."'
Clemens proceeded to arbitration before a Health Services Administration Panel (HSA) which rejected his claimF6 After the adverse HSA determination, defendant Apple sought partial summary judgment in a $250,000 personal injury lawsuit that Clemens
had filed on the ground that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped
from re-litigating the issue of whether the herniated disc was
caused by the automobile ac~ident."~
The trial court granted Apple's motion and the appellate division afErmedf17 The Court of Appeals adopted Justice Yesawich's
opinion granting estoppel but added that the decision was fully
consistent with Ryan."* The Court emphasized that the full and
fair opportunity requirement had been satisfied; moreover, the
court distinguished this case from Gilberg u. Barbieri44s by
stressing that Clemens, who was represented by counsel, freely
chose the arbitration forum after the commencement of his personal injury action and, therefore, could have foreseen the possibility of an adverse arbitral award precluding re-litigation of the

441. See id.
442. See Clemens, 65 N.Y.2d at 747,481 N.E.2d at 561, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
443. See id.
444. See id.
445. See id.
446. See id.
447. See id.
448. See rd. (citing Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478
N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984)).
449. 53 N.Y.2d 285, 423 N.E.2d 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981) (issue preclusion not applied because defendant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate issue of his
alleged striking of the plaintiff).
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causal factors relating to his disc injury.460The Clemens461case
was remanded for trial after the Court's decision and was settled
for $3,000 on the remaining claim.'63
The Court of Appeals qualified the Ryan and Clemens holdings in Liss v. Trans Auto Systems.468The Court held that if a
party is not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or
present evidence a t an administrative hearing, the outcome of the
hearing cannot have preclusive effect.'" The practitioner should
also be aware that the Liss decision does not overrule the Court of
~ ~ the
Appeals' holding in Brugman v. City of New Y ~ r k , 'where
doctrine was applied to give preclusive effect to an administrative
determination against a party who was denied a hearing of any
type.'66 The Liss decision makes it clear that an administrative determination is not entitled to preclusive effect against one who is
not a party to the administrative pro~eeding.'~?
Three other decisions during the Survey year are important.
' ~ ~ Appellate Division, Second DepartIn Fischer v. F i s ~ h e r the
ment, applied issue preclusion to bar a plaintiffs action for personal injuries on the grounds that an earlier arbitration decision
had denied the plaintiff recovery of basic economic loss for failure
to establish proximate cause. In Hill u. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
New Y ~ r k , 'the
~ ~ United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit refused to apply issue preclusion to bar the plaintiffs racial
discrimination claim.'60 Although a prior administrative determination by the Unemployment Insurance Board that the plaintiffs
misconduct led to his termination was binding, the court held that
the prior determination would not necessarily negate a subsequent
finding of dis~rimination.'~~
The court also rested its decision on

450. See Clemens, 65 N.Y.2d a t 747, 481 N.E.2d a t 561, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t 21.
451. See id.
452. See id.
453. 68 N.Y.2d 15, 496 N.E.2d 851, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1986).
454. See id. a t 16, 496 N.E.2d a t 852, 505 N.Y.S.2d a t 832.
455. 64 N.Y.2d 1011,478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985) (issue preclusion applied
to administrative findings in a disability proceeding to preclude plaintiff from litigating the
issue of the defendant's negligence in a tort lawsuit for damages).
456. See id.
457. See Liss,68 N.Y.2d a t 19, 496 N.E.2d a t 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d a t 836.
458. 118 A.D.2d 828, 500 N.Y.S.2d 313 (2d Dep't 1986).
459. 786 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1986).
460. See id. a t 551.
461. See id. a t 552.
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the fact that the employee's racial claims were only "briefly explored" in the administrative hearing."j2
The court did apply issue preclusion in Genova v. Town of
~
a discharged police officer brought a
South H a m p t ~ n , ' ~where
civil rights suit against the town
After a disciplinary hearing before the board, where it was determined that plaintiff had
disobeyed orders, the board declined to follow a hearing officer's
recommendation to suspend the plaintiff for ten days and instead
discharged him.46s The Second Circuit, citing Migra v. Warren
held
~ that because New York State princiCity School D i s t r i ~ t , ' ~
ples of issue preclusion would prevent Genova from contesting the
same factual issues in any later suit against the same parties, the
"appellant may not re-litigate these factud issues in a federal fo.,9467
rum.
Finally, the practitioner's attention should also be directed to
~ ~ is the most recent proUniversity of Tennessee v. E l l i ~ t , ' which
nouncement by the United States Supreme Court regarding the
application of issue preclusion to a state administrative determination. In Elliot, a state ALJ determined that the petitioner was not
motivated by racial prejudice in seeking to discharge the respondent.460The question was whether this finding was entitled to
preclusive effect in a federal court, where the respondent raised
discrimination claims under various civil rights laws.'70 The Supreme Court held that section 1738 of title 28 of the United States
Code does not require that a determination by an administrative
assistant to the Vice-President for Agriculture of the University of
Tennessee be given full faith and credit in subsequent federal litigation.'?' The Court also refused to fashion a federal common-law
rule of preclusion that would bar the respondent from litigating his
claim against the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights

..

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

See id. at 553-54.
776 F.2d 1560 (2d Cir. 1986).

See id.
See id.
465 U.S.75 (1984).

See Genoua, 776 F.2d at 1561.
106 S. Ct. 3220 (1986).
See id. at 3222.
See id.
See id. at 3224.
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Act of 1984.'72 The Court, however, did conclude that the findings
of the administrative assistant barred respondents claims under 42
U.S.C. 1983 and other sections of the Civil Rights
VI. DISCLOSURE
Of the many disclosure decisions rendered during the Survey
year, the following areas should be of interest to the practitioner.
A. Scope of Disclosure Under CPLR 3101

1. CPLR 3101 (a)
Although case law during the Survey year continued to recognize that disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101474is wide and embraces all information necessary to the prosecution or defense of
an a~tion,'?~
there are some limitations to what a party may discover. In Seltel, Inc. v. Channel Communications, Inc.,'?= the issue
in a contract action was whether the defendant's obligation under
the contract was excused by the plaintifPs failure to make "best
efforts" as a national sales repre~entative.'~?The defendant's request to discover information relating to the plaintiffs failure to
perform under other contracts was denied.'78 The Appellate Division, First Department, held that although the data might lead to
relevant information, it was not necessary or material to the defen~e.'?~Similarly, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held
that a plaintiffs demand for production of certain correspondence,
documents, statements, tape recordings and records relating to a
deceased person was overbroad.'80 The Third Department stressed
that the plaintiff could prove his case without this material.481

472. See id. a t 3225.
473. See id.
474. See N.Y. CPLR 3101 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
475. See Seltel, Inc. v. Channel Communications, Inc., 120 A.D.2d 991, 505 N.Y.S.2d
628 (1st Dep't 1986); Hughes v. Elias, 120 A.D.2d 703, 502 N.Y.S.2d 772 (2d Dep't 1986);
Sabro Realty Corp. v. Kradjian, 116 A.D.2d 866, 498 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1st Dep't 1986); Carp V.
Marcus, 116 A.D.2d 254, 498 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d Dep't 1986).
476. 120 A.D.2d 991, 505 N.Y.S.2d 628.
477. See id. a t 992, 505 N.Y.S.2d a t 628.
478. See id.
479. See id. a t 992, 505 N.Y.S.2d a t 629-30.
480. See Carp, 116 A.D.2d a t 254, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 174.
481. See id. a t 256,498 N.Y.S.2d a t 177.
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2. CPLR 31 01(d)

CPLR 3101(d)482was amended in 1985 to liberalize discovery
relating to trial experts. The new provision, which is similar to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4), applies to cases filed on
or after July 1, 1985. Thus, parties are required in all cases, other
~ ~ ~ to disclose the name
than medical, dental and p o d i a t r i ~matters,
of any expert witness they intend to call a t trial.4s4Three decisions
interpreting this new provision should be noted. In Pierson v.
Y o ~ r i s h , ' ~the
~ Appellate Division, Third Department, held that
CPLR 3101(d)486could not serve to protect the report of an unnamed physician from disclo~ure.'~~
In Dunn v. Medina Memorial
Ho~pital,'~~
the defendants in a medical malpractice action moved
for an order compelling plaintiff to retain an expert immediately or
to be precluded from offering expert testimony a t trial.'89 The
court held that, in the absence of evidence that there was insufficient time prior to the start of a trial, the defendants could not
force the plaintiff to retain an expert.'90 On the other hand, if the
plaintiff intentionally did not comply with CPLR 3101(d),'91 the
court noted that it could exclude the testimony of the expert altogether.'9P Finally, in Rogowski v. Royce W. Day CO.,'~~
a thirdparty defendant sought discovery of information concerning an ex-

482. See N.Y. CPLR 3101(d) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
483. See N.Y. CPLR 3101(d)(l), which was amended by Chapter 485 of the Laws of
1986 to include pediatric experts. The amendment became effective on July 21,1986. See id.
484. See 3A WEINSTEIN-KORN-MULER,
supra note 44, a t 5 3101.52 (1985); see also
Penucci v. Mercy Hosp., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1986, a t 14, col. 3 (2d Dep't 1986). In a ruliig of
apparent first impression, the Second Department limited the scope of discovery available
to attorneys in medical malpractice actions under CPLR 3101(d). The court, in a r m i n g an
order striking the defendant's demand in its entirety, ruled that "absent a showing that a
party seeking discovery has need of materials in the preparation of the case and is unable
without undue hardship to obtain a substantial equivalent by other means, material prepared 'in anticipation of litigation or of trial' are exempt from disclosure." Thus, a medical
report by an expert remains exempt under CPLR 3101(d). Therefore, the court's decision
curtails extensive disclosure by either side regarding expert witnesses in terms of providing
their identity, qualifications, and findings. See id.
485. 120 A.D.2d 899, 505 N.Y.S.2d 165 (3d Dep't 1986).
486. See N.Y. CPLR 3101(d).
487. See Pierson, 120 A.D.2d a t 902, 505 N.Y.S.2d a t 166.
488. 131 Misc. 2d 971, 502 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1986).
489. See id. a t 973, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 634.
490. See id. a t 974, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 635.
491. See N.Y. CPLR 3101(d).
492. See Dunn, 131 Misc. a t 972, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 635.
493. 130 Misc. 2d 801, 497 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1986).
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pert witness who would testify a t trial.4B4The court held that the
third-party action did not benefit from CPLR 3101(d).'B6 Although
the third-party complaint and summons were served after July 1,
1985, that action was merely a part of the principle litigation that
was commenced prior to the amendment's effective date.'B6

B. Physical or Mental Examinations
Two issues of apparent first impression were decided by courts
during the Survey year. In Reardon v. Port A ~ t h o r i t y , 'the
~ ~ defendant sought an order directing the plaintiff to appear a t a psychiatric examination and a further order excluding the plaintiffs
attorney from the examining room.'B8 In a well reasoned opinion,
the court concluded that the attorney could attend the examinat i ~ n and
' ~ ~held that a party has the right to have counsel present
a t every crucial stage of the litigation process.500In Soybel v. Gruber,601the plaintiff landlord moved to conduct a physical examination of a holdover tenant to determine whether the tenant could
return to the apartment and maintain the premises as her primary
residence.502The court denied the motion on the ground that the
defendant did not affirmatively place her physical condition in
controversy.60sFurthermore, the court found that the physical examination might be unduly burdensome to the defendant.604
C. Penalties for Refusal to Comply with Order to Disclose

Under CPLR 3126606any party or person who refuses to obey
an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information is
subject to sanction.606During the Survey year, the appellate division frequently affirmed the imposition of sanctions which include

494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.

See
See
See
132
See
See
See
132
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. a t 801, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 865; N.Y. CPLR 3101.
Rogowski, 130 Misc. 2d at 801, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
Misc. 2d 212, 503 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1986).
id.
id. at 213, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
id.
Misc. 2d 34, 504 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1986).
id. at 35, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
id. at 36, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
id.
N.Y. CPLR 3126 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
id.
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fines to be personally paid by a plaintiffs attorneyso7as well as
dismissal of an action for the plaintiffs failure to attend a court
ordered deposition.s08In Conklin v. H0well,6~~
the Appellate Division, Third Department, imposed monetary sanctions against
plaintiffs counsel when both sides agreed to adjourn court ordered
depositions to a later date.610The message is clear that attorneys
are being held accountable to strict compliance with CPLR 3126.s11

VII. MOTIONS
A. Motion to Vacate
CPLR 5015(a) lists the principal grounds for vacating a judgment or order. They are: excusable default, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party, lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order, and revival, modification or vacator of a prior judgment or order upon
which it is based.614 Several decisions51gduring the Survey year
demonstrate that the provisions providing for vacating a default
judgment under CPLR 5015(a)"14are liberally interpreted, particularly if a party has a meritorious defense.

507. See Farrell v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 120 A.D.2d 778, 501 N.Y.S.2d
235 (3d Dep't 1986).
508. See Henderson v. Stilwell, 116 A.D.2d 861,498 N.Y.S.2d 183 (3d Dep't 1986).
509. 120 A.D.2d 637, 502 N.Y.S.2d 239 (3d Dep't 1986).
510. See id.
511. See Klein v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 121 A.D.2d 164, 502 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dep't
1986); Higdon v. County of Nassau, 121 A.D.2d 366, 502 N.Y.S.2d 797 (2d Dep't 1986);
Anteri v. NRS Constr. Corp., 117 A.D.2d 696, 498 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1986); Fremer v.
Woodecrest Club, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 646,498 N.Y.S.2d 387 (2d Dep't 1986); Glen Travel Plaza
v. H.G. Anderson Equip., 118 A.D.2d 185, 504 N.Y.S.2d 298 (3d Dep't 1986); Passaro v.
Paeearo, 120 A.D.2d 658, 502 N.Y.S.2d 253 (3d Dep't 1986).
512. See N.Y. CPLR 5015(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987). CPLR 5015(a) provides that "the
Court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as
may be just, on motion of any interested person with such notice as the court may direct
upon the ground of [(I), (2), (3), (4), or (5)]." See id.
513. See Eugene DiLorenzo, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lumber, 67 N.Y.2d 138, 492 N.E.2d
116, 501 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1986); Picinich v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 504, 497 N.Y.S.2d
924 (1st Dep't 1986); Vodola v. Lambert, 116 A.D.2d 641,497 N.Y.S.2d 720 (2d Dep't 1986);
DeFalco v. J.R.S. Confectionary, 118 A.D.2d 752,500 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2d Dep't 1986); Jacobs
v. Haber, 118 A.D.2d 686,500 N.Y.S.2d 135 (2d Dep't 1986); Rainbow Food Corp. v. Tasty
Donut, Inc., 119 A.D.2d 648,500 N.Y.S.2d 794 (2d Dep't 1986); Berlin v. Schlotthauer, 117
A.D.2d 768,499 N.Y.S.2d 421 (2d Dep't 1986); Woodward v. New York, 119 A.D.2d 749,501
N.Y.S.2d 159 (2d Dep't 1986); Nahal v. C & S Bldg. Materials, Inc., 116 A.D.2d 822, 497
N.Y.S.2d 209 (3d Dep't 1986).
514. See N.Y. CPLR 5015(a).
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In Eugene DiLorenzo, Inc. u. A.C. Dutton Lumber,516the
Court of Appeals held that the moving party must demonstrate
both a reasonable excuse for failing to appear and answer the complaint and a meritorious defense to the action.616The Court, however, held that a trial court sometimes has the discretion to treat a
CPLR 5015(a)617motion as having been made as well as pursuant
to CPLR 317.518This is important because CPLR 31751s does not
require a defendant to show a "reasonable excuse for its
A motion made under subdivision (1) of CPLR 5015(a)5P1
should be made in either one of two ways. First, the motion may
be made within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or
order along with written notice of its entry upon the moving party,
or second, the motion may be made if the moving party has entered the judgment or order, within one year after the entry.6a4If a
party fails to serve a copy of the order with the notice of entry, the
one year time limitation does not begin to run.52s Excusable neglect exists if one co-defendant was absent from the country and the
other co-defendant believed that settlement negotiations were und e r ~ a y Similarly,
. ~ ~ ~ a forty-eight hour delay in filing an answer
due to law office failure was held to be exc~sable."~Also, a corporate defendant's failure to answer after service upon it was made
by delivery of a summons and complaint to the Secretary of State
was excused when the corporation had failed to update its address.526A defendant's belief that another proceeding vitiated the
default judgment does not excuse his failure to file an answer and

515. 67 N.Y.2d 138, 492 N.E.2d 116, 501 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1986).
516. See id. a t 140,492 N.E.2d a t 119, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 11.
517. See N.Y. CPLR 5015(a).
518. See DiLorenzo, 67 N.Y.2d a t 140, 492 N.E.2d at 119, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 11. Thus,
"where a defendant cites only CPLR 5015(a) in support of a motion to grant a default judgment, the court. . has the discretion to treat a CPLR 5015(a) motion as having been made
as well pursuant to CPLR 317." See id.
519. See N.Y. CPLR 317 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
520. See DiLorenzo, 67 N.Y.2d at 140,492 N.E.2d a t 119, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 11.
521. See N.Y. CPLR 5015(a).
522. See supra note 512; see also Friedberg v. Bay Ridge Orthopedic Assocs., P.C., 122
A.D.2d 194,504 N.Y.S.2d 731 (2d Dep't 1986) (plaintiff, who did not move to vacate default
judgment until more than two years after case was marked off calendar, failed to overcome
presumption of abandonment created by rule after passage of one year).
523. See DeFalco, 118 A.D.2d at 752, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 143.
524. See Jacobs, 118 A.D.2d a t 686, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
525. See Picinic, 117 A.D.2d a t 504,497 N.Y.S.2d a t 924.
526. See DiLorenzo, 67 N.Y.2d a t 138, 492 N.E.2d at 116, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 8.

.
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the default judgment will stand.527In another case, the Appellate
Division, Third Department, held that a defendant, who claimed
that his default in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding was due to
his involvement in a proceeding before the State Commission on
Judicial Conduct, failed to establish that his default was excusable.628When asserting facts constituting a meritorious defense, the
practitioner must establish the defense by specific, and not conclusory, allegations.52sIf the defense is established with particularity, courts will usually, assuming an excusable default, vacate the
judgment.5s0
Lawyers seeking t o use subdivision (2) of CPLR
5015(a)631-newly discovered evidence-are held accountable to a
strict due diligence test.632Thus, in Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. v. Schwartz,'jssa letter discoverable with due diligence prior
to entry of summary judgment against a guarantor was not newly
discovered evidence.634On the other hand, evidence that a title
holder conveyed real property to a possessor in satisfaction of gambling and loan sharking debts constituted newly discovered evidence sulaEicient to vacate a judgment against defendants in an action to recover possession of real property.636
Subdivision (3) of CPLR 5015(a)536-fraud, misrepresentation
or misconduct of an adversary party-requires that a party establish by a preponderance of clear, positive and satisfactory evidence
any fraud, misconduct or other circumstances that would require
the judgment in question to be set aside.537

527. See Hoosac Valley Farmers' Exch. v. Lewis, 117 A.D.2d 859,498 N.Y.S.2d 568 (3d
Dep't 1986).
528. See Glens Falls Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Katz, 118 A.D.2d 906,499 N.Y.S.2d 474
(3d Dep't 1986); see also Rainbow Food, 119 A.D.2d a t 648, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 794.
529. See State v. Wiley, 117 A.D.2d 856, 498 N.Y.S.2d 556 (3d Dep't 1986).
530. See DiLorenzo, 67 N.Y.2d a t 138,492 N.E.2d a t 116,501 N.Y.S.2d a t 8; Berlin, 117
A.D.2d at 768,499 N.Y.S.2d a t 421; Nahal, 116 A.D.2d a t 822,497 N.Y.S.2d a t 209; Woodward, 119 A.D.2d at 749, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 159.
531. See N.Y. CPLR 5015(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
532. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Schwartz, 116 A.D.2d 619,497 N.Y.S.2d 477 (2d
Dep't 1986).
533. Id.
534. See id. a t 621, 497 N.Y.S.2d a t 479.
535. See Vodola, 116 A.D.2d a t 641, 497 N.Y.S.2d a t 720.
536. See N.Y. CPLR 5015(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
537. See Poughkeepsie v. Albano, 122 A.D.2d 14, 504 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2d Dep't 1986);
Imor v. Imor, 119 A.D.2d 913, 501 N.Y.S.2d 195 (3d Dep't 1986).
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B. Motion to Amend

CPLR 3025(b) provides that a party may amend his pleadings,
or supplement them by setting forth additional or subsequent
transactions or occurrences at any time by leave of court or by
stipulation of the parties.5s8This provision is one of the most important and often used provisions in New York practice.6s9It permits a party to conform his pleadings to the substantive rights involved, whenever it can be achieved without prejudice.640If there is
no prejudice to one's adversary, leave to amend must be freely
given.LH1If, however, the facts on which a proposed amendment are
based were known to the moving party when he filed the original
pleading, courts are less likely to grant the motion. This assertion
is particularly accurate when lateness is accompanied by significant prejudice.
Several decisions during the Survey year illustrate the importance of the term "prejudice." In Bellini v. Gersalle Realty
C ~ r p . the
, ~ ~plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint to
drop a co-plaintiff despite the defendant's contention that by doing so the effect would be to revive a time-barred action.64sThe
Appellate Division, First Department, held that the amendment
related back to the original pleading, which gave the defendant
sufficient notice from which the new claim arose.544The First Department pointed out that leave to amend should be freely given in
the absence of prejudice to the other party traceable to the omission from the original pleading, some change of position, hindrance
in the preparation of a case, or significant trouble or expense that
could have been avoided had the original pleading contained what
the amended one seeks to add.545
Similarly, in Duffy v. Horten Memorial H o ~ p i t a l , 6the
~ ~ Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the plaintiff could

538. See N.Y. CPLR 3025(b) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
539. See id.
540. See id.
541. See Bellini v. Gersalle Realty Corp., 120 A.D.2d 345, 501 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1st Dep't
1986).
542. Id.
543. See id. at 346, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
544. See id. at 347, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
545. See id. at 346, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
546. 109 A.D.2d 927, 486 N.Y.S.2d 402 (3d Dep't 1986); see also Note, The Relation
L. REV.281 (1986).
Back of Claims Against Third Party Defendants, 118 CARDOZO
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amend her complaint to assert a direct cause of action against a
third-party defendant because she was apprised of the underlying
lawsuit. The court stated: "[p]laintiffs amended complaint . . . involves the same transactions and facts as the underlying suit."647
In Martin v. Board of Election~,6~~
the Court of Appeals held that
failure to name all necessary parties in the petition was a jurisdictional defect and because the statute of limitation had run, the
amendment was prohibited and the petition dismissed.64B
In Stow u. City of New Y0rk,6~Oa city fire fighter sued the city
to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained while fighting a
fire.661The city moved under CPLR 3025(b)662to amend its answer
to include a denial of ownership of the building where the accident
allegedly occurred.66sThe city had previously answered incorrectly,
admitting ownership of the building.664 The plaintiif's claim of
prejudice was disregarded because he had earlier testified at an administrative hearing that he had actually 'known that another person owned the
Finally, the practitioner should be careful, when moving to
amend to add a new cause of action, to attach affidavits to his
moving papers which particularize his reasons for the
amendment.666

VIII. JOINDER
AND INTERVENTION
Several significant decisions during the Survey year effect

547. Duffy,109 A.D.2d a t 929,486 N.Y.S.2d a t 404; see also Buley v. Beacon Tex-Print,
Ltd., 118 A.D.2d 630 499 N.Y.S.2d 782 (2d Dep't 1986) (while plaintiffs amendment to add
a strict products liability claim to a personal injury action would prejudice the defendant,
the defendant had knowledge of the underlying transaction from the original complaint and
the proposed cause of action contained no factual allegations which were not set forth in the
prior pleading).
548. 67 N.Y.2d 634, 490 N.E.2d 531, 499 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1986).
549. See id. a t 635, 490 N.E.2d a t 531, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 664.
550. 122 A.D.2d 45, 504 N.Y.S.2d 205 (2d Dep't 1986).
551. See id.
552. See N.Y. CPLR 3025(b).
553. See Stow, 122 A.D.2d a t 45, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t 205.
554. See id. a t 46, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t 206.
555. See id.
556. See Liebman v. Newhouse, 122 A.D.2d 252,505 N.Y.S.2d 6 (2d Dep't 1986). Plaintiffs motion to amend his medical malpractice action to add a claim for wrongful death was
denied, without prejudice, because the affidavit submitted by plaintiff was silent as to any
malpractice by the defendant. The affidavit also failed to allege a causal connection between
the malpractice and the decedent's death. See id.

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 125 1987-1988

126

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 38:67

joinder and intervention under Article 10 of the CPLR.

A. Joinder

In Martin v. Board of E l e ~ t i o n s , ~the
~ ?Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the supreme court dismissing the petitioner's
suit for failure to name certain indispensable parties.668The petitioners sought to invalidate the nomination and designation by the
Liberal Party of Walter F. Mondale for President and Geraldine A.
Ferraro for Vice-Pre~ident.~~~
The petition named the chairman
and secretary of the Liberal Party as respondents but failed to join
other necessary party officers as defendants.660The petition would
normally have been dismissible without prejudice under CPLR
1003 because these persons might have been inequitably affected
under CPLR 1001681by a judgment in the action."* The Court
held the defect in the initial pleading was jurisdictional and, because the statute of limitations had run, dismissed the petition
with prejudice.56s Thus, the practitioner should be careful to include all necessary parties when his complaint is filed. If he or she
fails to do so, a timely amendment should be made.
In Joanne v. Carey:u the Appellate Division, First Department, reversing a decision by the supreme court, held that New
York City municipal agencies were necessary or indispensable parties in an action brought by state psychiatric hospital patients.5d5
The court emphasized that the controversy could be settled without considering the interest of the city agencies because the primary responsibility rests with the state for assuring that discharged state mental patients are properly placed.688Furthermore,
joinder of these non-adversarial parties would impede and delay
557. 67 N.Y.2d 634,490 N.E.2d 531, 499 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1986).
558. See id.
559. See id.
560. See id.
561. See N.Y. CPLR 1001 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
562. See Martin, 67 N.Y.2d a t 635,490 N.E.2d a t 532, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 655.
563. See id.
564. 115 A.D.2d 4, 498 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1st Dep't 1986).
565. See id. a t 5, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 818.
566. See id. Moreover, the First Department pointed out that the primary reason for
compulsory joinder of parties is to avoid multiplicity of actions and to protect nonpartiee
whose rights should not be jeopardized if they have a material interest in the subject matter.
The court concluded that because section 29.15 of the Mental Hygiene Law merely required
the city agencies to cooperate with the state, they were not necessary parties. See id.
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the disposition of the plaintiffs claims.567

B. Intervention
and someIntervention is sometimes available as a
times in the court's discreti0n,6~~
though it must always be sought
by motion. Although courts are liberal in their allowance, several
cases during the Survey year caution the practitioner to read
CPLR 1012,5701013571and 1014672carefully. First, in the absence
of a timely motion made in accordance with CPLR 221467sand accompanied by a proposed pleading as required by CPLR 1014:74 a
Second, courts can
court cannot entertain a request to inter~ene."~
be expected to strictly interpret the requirements of CPLR
1012(a)(2).w6Thus, in Kaczmarek v. S h ~ f f s t r a l lthe
, ~ ~Appellate
~
Division, Fourth Department, refused to permit an insurer to intervene in a personal injury action even though its interests would
not be adequately represented by the parties because of a possible
conflict of interest.578The court, citing Ryan v. New York Telephone CO.:'~ rested its decision on the fact that under the principles of res judicata, the insurer would not be bound by the judgment.680Similarly, the court held that the insurer would not be
collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of indemnification in
a subsequent action because it would not be given a full and fair
.~~~
opportunity to contest the decision said to be d i s p o s i t i ~ e The
KaczmarekE8'decision seems to be contrary to notions of judicial
economy advanced by the Court of Appeals in Ryan68sand Gilberg

567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.

See id.
See N.Y. CPLR 1012 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
See id. 5 1013.
See id. 5 1012.
See id. 3 1013.
See id. 5 1014.
See id. 3 2214.
See id. 4 1014.
See Rozewicz v. Ciminelli, 116 A.D.2d 990, 498 N.Y.S.2d 613 (4th Dep't 1986).
See N.Y. CPLR 1012(a)(2).
119 A.D.2d 1001, 500 N.Y.S.2d 902 (4th Dep't 1986).
See id. a t 1001, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 903.
See Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d a t 494, 467 N.E.2d a t 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 823.
See Kaczmarek, 119 A.D.2d a t 1002, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 903.
See id. a t 1003, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 903.
See id. a t 1001, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 902.
See Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d a t 494, 467 N.E.2d a t 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 823.
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IX. VENUE
The venue cases reported during the Survey year mainly involved a routine application of statutory provisions.686Worthy of
note is Thomas v. Small,"s6 where the court held that a defendant's proffer of the witnesses' names and addresses, their occupations, their expected testimony, and the materiality of that testimony was sufficient to show whether the convenience of the
witnesses would be promoted by changing venue.587
The convenience of nonparty witnesses was addressed in Troy
Savings Bank v. American Equity Funding, Inc.PS8 where the
court held that to determine proper venue in a case where a party
seeks to consolidate two separate actions that were brought in two
separate counties, the overriding consideration is the location of
the principal nonparty witness?sB Consolidation cases, require a
more precise analysis than nonconsolidated cases. For example, in
the court stated that the determination
Heyco, Inc. v. HeymanPBO
of whether an action should be transferred for the convenience of
parties and witnesses depends upon a balancing of a multitude of

584. See Giberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 424 N.E.2d 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981);
see also Carlisle, supra note 423, a t 87-98.
585. See Brenner v. Joubert, 118 A.D.2d 424,499 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dep't 1986). Venue
was originally placed in New York County solely on the basis that the A-Corp maintained a
place of business in that county. Nevertheless, the Appellate Division, First Department,
granted a motion for change of venue under CPLR 510(3) because venue of a transitory
action should ordinarily be in the county where the cause of action arises. This is especially
so where the preponderance of witnesses resided in the county in which the action aroee.
See id.; see also Ohesnstein v. LaGuardia Racquet Club, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 515,500 N.Y.S.2d
177 (1st Dep't 1986) (county in which cause of action arose, and every nonparty witness
resided, was proper county for venue rather than county in which the plaintiff resided);
McGuire v. General Elec. Co., 117 A.D.2d 523,498 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1st Dep't 1986) (trial court
abused its discretion in denying a motion for change of venue to the location where the
cause of action arose even though venue as originally placed was not improper); Tepper v.
Feldman, 117 A.D.2d 523,498 N.Y.S.2d 65 (2d Dep't 1986) (Special Term did not abuse ita
discretion in granting a change of venue to the county where the cause of action arose and
the trial calendar was less congested even though the motion for change of venue was made
approximately one year after commencement of the suit).
586. 121 A.D.2d 622, 504 N.Y.S.2d 132 (2d Dep't. 1986).
587. See id. at 623, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t 133.
588. 120 A.D.2d 828, 502 N.Y.S.2d 107 (3d Dep't 1986).
589. See id. at 829, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
590. 636 F. Supp. 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 128 1987-1988

19871

129

Civil Practice

factors.6g1These factors include the ease of access to proof, availability of witnesses, where operative facts occurred, the location of
particular documents, and the existence of a forum selection clause
in the parties' contract.6saThis case-by-case balancing test is consistent with prior venue determination^:^^ but Troy Savings
BankBg4
shows that the determination of proper venue for purposes
of consolidation does not require as thorough a balancing test as
generally required for venue determination^.^^^ This issue of convenience is only addressed after venue is found to be proper.BsB
In Ziegler v. Rieff:s7 the court held that in federal admiralty
practice, venue is proper in any district in which valid service of
process may be made on the defendant.6s8This merger of the analysis of personal jurisdiction and service was also relied on in New
York Higher Education Services Corp. v. Melendez.6sg In
MelendezPoOa guarantor brought an action seeking reimbursement
from the debtor after the debtor defaulted in payment on a student loan.601Defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of
personal jurisdiction.BO*The court said that venue in the first instance was proper. The trial court, however, did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion for change of venue because the defendant raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether
personal jurisdiction was ever obtained.BoS Consequently, even
though personal jurisdiction and venue are separate doctrines, personal jurisdiction still plays a significant part in the determination
of proper venue.

591. See id. at 1548.
592. See id.
593. See 5 WEINSTEIN-KORN-M~LER,
supra note 44,
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.

3 5.06[d].

See Troy, 124 A.D.2d at 828, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
See id.
See 5 WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER,
supra note 44, § 5011.10-5011.21.
637 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
See id. at 676.

599. 120 A.D.2d 801, 501 N.Y.S.2d 539 (3d Dep't 1986).
600. See id.
601. See id.
602. See id.
603. See id.
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214-a

214-c
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CPLR Legislation

SYNOPSIS
Reference to Judiciary Law 5 229(3) was
deleted.
Statutory change to
make the ten-year
maximum under the
disability of infancy
or insanity applicable
to actions for podiatric malpractice.
Statutory change to
exclude actions for
podiatric malpractice
from those actions
which must be commenced within three
years.
Statutory addition to
add references to
new section 214-c
Statutory addition to
apply to actions for
podiatric malpractice.
Statutory addition
applicable to "substance" cases changing accrual from date
of last exposure to
date of discovery.
Repeal of portion of
paragraph (5) relating to the entry of a
default judgment in

DATE
AMENDMENT
AFFECTIVE CHAPTER
7/17/86
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a nonpayment action
to become new paragraph (3) of CPLR
3215(f).
Statutory addition to
include proceedings
against the commissioner of taxation
and finance and the
tax appeals tribunal.
Statutory change of
three thousand dollars as the value of
the property which a
court may order distributed to five thousand dollars.
Statutory addition of
the phrase "Unless
otherwise provided
by rule of the chief
administrator of the
courts."
New paragraph 14
added including the
special D.A. in
charge of the office
of Special Prosecutor, special narcotics
court of New York
City within the definition of "district attorney" for purposes
of forfeiture actions.
Statutory change to
add under sheriffs
and deupty sheriffs
of New York City to
the definition of
claiming agent for

9/1/87

282

9/1/86

125

7/17/86

355

11/1/86

8

11/1/86

174
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132

1349(d),(e)

2212(c),(d)
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purposes of forfeitures.
Statutory change of
paragraph (d) by replacing condition of
a pre-conviction forfeiture crime with a
felony; paragraph (e)
was amended by replacing the condition
of a post-forfeiture
crime with "all other
crimes."
Joint liability rule
partially abolished
by addition of Article 16. Only personal
injury and non-economic loss affected.
Statutory change of
subdivisions (c) and
(d) by replacing references to the appellate division or appellate division rules
with "chief administrator of the courts"
and "rules of the
chief administrator
of the courts."
Statutory change by
including reference
"chief administrator
of the courts" instead of appellate division.
Statutory addition
allowing the chief
administrator of the
courts to exclude
motions, by rule,

[Vol. 38:67

7/1/86

231

7130186

682

7/17/86

355

7/17/86

355

7/17/86

355
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2306(a)

3012-a

within a department,
district, or county
from operations of
CPLR 22171a) and
(4.
Statutory addition of
new subdivision (b)
allowing chief administrator of the courts
to exclude motions
within department,
district or a county
from operation of
CPLR 2221(a).
Statutory addition to
allow full sized legible reproduction of
hospital records in
response to a subpoena duces tecum.
Changes time for
service of subpoena
from twenty-four
hours to three days
before the time fixed
for the production of
records.
Statutory addition of
section 3012-a relating to certificates of
merit in medical and
dental malpractice
actions.
Statutory addition of
new subdivision (h)
requiring a verified
complaint in actions
based upon § 720(a)
of the Not-For-Profit
Corporation Law.
Statutory addition

7/17/86

1/1/87

7/8/86

6/28/86

7/8/86
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3101(d)(i)

3101(d)(ii)

entitled "Arbitration
of damages in medical and dental malpractice actions."
Statutory change to
provide that in actions for podiatric
malpractice, a party
responding to a request for pretrial
disclosure of expert
testimony may omit
the names of podiatric experts.
Statutory change to
provide that in
podiatric malpractice
actions a party may,
without court order,
take the testimony of
a person authorized
to practice podiatry
who is the party's
treating or retained
expert.
Statutory change to
add phrase "Unless
otherwise provided
by rule of the chief
administrator of the
courts" to the beginning of the paragraph.
Statutory change of
CPLR 3130(1) to allow service of written
interrogatories after
commencement of a
matrimonial action.
Statutory change
that parties cannot

[Vol. 38:67

7/21/86

485

7/21/86

485

7/17/86

355

9/1/86

257

8/21/86

467

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 134 1987-1988

Civil Practice

3211-a

3214(a)

3215(d)

3215(f)

3222(b)(3)

serve interrogatories
on or conduct a deposition of the same
party pursuant to
CPLR 3107 without
leave of court.
Statutory addition of 6/28/86
paragraph (11)to
provide for a motion
to dismiss when a
party is immune
from liability under
3 720(a) of the NotFor-Profit Corporation Law.
Statutory addition of 7/17/86
the phrase "Unless
the chief administrator of the courts has,
by rule, provided
otherwise" to the beginning of the paragraph.
Statutory change of
7/17/86
reference to local
court rules to rules
"of the chief administrator of the
courts."
Statutory addition of 1/1/87
paragraph (3) relating to the additional
notice required to
take a default action
in an action against
a natural person
based upon nonpayment of a contractual obligation.
Statutory change to
7/17/86
provide that either
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3403(a)(5)
3406(a)
4102(d)

4111
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the supreme court or
appellate division
may determine a
submission made to
the supreme court;
reference to special
term was deleted.
Statutory change to
replace the reference
to the appellate division with "chief administrator of the
courts" and replacing
the phrase "supreme
court in each department" with "courts
of the unified court
system."
Statutory change to
apply to podiatric
malpractice actions.
Statutroy change to
apply to podiatric
malpractice actions.
Statutory change to
replace reference to
appellate division
with "chief administrator of the courts."
Statutory addition of
subdivision (f) requiring an itemized
verdict in certain actions to recover damages for personal injury, injury to
property or wrongful
death.
Statutory change to
apply to podiatric
malpractice actions.

[Vol. 38:67

7/17/86

355

7/21/86

485

7/21/86

485

7/17/86

355

7130186

682

7/21/86

485
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19871
4213(b)

4532

4545(a)
4545(c)

4546

5014

Civil Practice

Statutory change to
apply to actions involving personal injury, injury to property or wrongful
death.
Statutory change to
allow for the selfauthentications of
newspapers and periodicals of general
circulation for purposes of admissibility
at trial.
Statutory change to
apply to podiatric
malpractice actions.
Statutory addition of
paragraph (c) to
CPLR 4545, providing that in an action
for injury to person
or property or
wrongful death, recovery will be reduced by the amount
paid to plaintiff from
any collateral source,
such as insurance,
social security, etc.
Statutory addition
relating to loss or
impairment of earning ability in medical
or dental malpractice
actions.
Statutory addition of
paragraph allowing
renewal judgments
the year prior to the
expiration of ten

7130186

5/28/86

7/21/86
6/28/86

7130186

9/1/86
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5031
5037
50-B

5205(h)(2)
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years since the first
docketing of the
judgment.
Statutory change to
apply to podiatric
malpractice actions.
Statutory change to
apply to podiatric
malpractice actions.
Statutory additions
of CPLR 5041
through 5049, entitled "Periodic payment of judgments
in personal injury,
injury to property
and wrongful death
actions."
Statutory change to
exempt "service
dogs" form property
applicable to the satisfaction fo a money
judgment.
Statutory change to
reduce from six
months to ninety
days the amount of
time for an accounting of monies collected by a sheriff.
Statutory change to
allow the appellate
division to decide
whether a money
judgment is an action in which an
itemized verdict is
required under
CPLR 4111 is excessive, inadequate or

[Vol. 38:67

7/21/86

485

7/21/86

485

7130186

682

7/21/86

404

8/1/86

7130186

682
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Civil Practice

unreasonable.
5522
Statutory addition of
subdivision (b), requiring the appellate
division, in appeals
for money judgments
in actions where an
itemized verdict is
required under
CPLR 4111, to set
forth in its decision
the reasons it found
such award to be excessive or inadequate.
5601(d)
Statutory change to
allow appeal to the
Court of Appeals as
of right from a final
arbitration award.
5602(1)(a)
Statutory change to
allow appeal to the
Court of Appeals by
permission in actions
originating in an arbitration from a final
arbitrator's award.
7002(b)(1),(5) Statutory change deleting references to
special term.
75-A
Statutory addition of
Article 75-A, entitled
"Health Care Arbitration" and comprising CPLR 7550
through 7565.
7804(b),(h)
Statutory change by
deleting references to
special term.
8303-a(a)
Statutory addition to
allow for costs upon

7130186

1/1/87

1/1/87

7/17/86
7/8/86

7/17/86
6/28/86

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 139 1987-1988

Syracuse Law Review

8303-a(a)
9002

frivolous claims and
counterclaims, and
statutory deletion of
references to dental
and medical malpractice.
Statutory change to
apply to podiatric
malpractice actions.
Statutory addition of
the phrase "Unless
otherwise provided
by rule of the chief
administrator of the
courts" at the beginning of the second
sentence.

[Vol. 38:67

7/21/86

485

7/17/86

355
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